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ARTICLE
CONTRACTING OUT OF THE FIDUCIARY DUTY OF
LOYALTY: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE
OPPORTUNITY WAIVERS
Gabriel Rauterberg* & Eric Talley**
For centuries, the duty of loyalty has been the hallowed centerpiece
of ﬁduciary obligation, widely considered one of the few “mandatory”
rules of corporate law. That view, however, is no longer true. Beginning
in 2000, Delaware dramatically departed from tradition by granting
incorporated entities a statutory right to waive a crucial part of the duty
of loyalty: the corporate opportunities doctrine. Other states have since
followed Delaware’s lead, similarly permitting ﬁrms to execute “corporate opportunity waivers.” Surprisingly, more than ﬁfteen years into this
reform experiment, no study has attempted to either systematically measure the corporate response to these reforms or evaluate the implications
of that response.
This Article offers the ﬁrst broad empirical investigation of the
area. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we ﬁnd that well over one thousand public corporations have adopted waivers—often with capacious
scope and reach. The Article thus establishes a central empirical fact
that is an important baseline for further discussion: Public corporations
have an enormous appetite for contracting out of the duty of loyalty
when freed to do so. This analysis also sheds light on the high-stakes
normative debate around the relationship between ﬁduciary principles
and freedom of contract. What types of corporations choose to contract
around default rules? When they do so, do such measures tend to bolster
or thwart shareholder welfare? The Article develops an efficient contracting approach to explain why corporations—and their share*. Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
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holders—might favor tailoring the duty of loyalty and presents evidence
assessing the merits of Delaware’s experiment.
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INTRODUCTION
For nearly two centuries, a cornerstone of Anglo-American corporate law has been the ﬁduciary duty of loyalty, the most demanding and
litigated ﬁduciary obligation imposed on corporate managers.1 The
duty—which regulates ﬁnancial conﬂicts of interest and requires managers to subordinate their own interests to the corporation’s—represents a
key policy lever to address the most pernicious of intra-ﬁrm agency costs.2
Practitioners, academics, and jurists alike have characterized loyalty as
the most important ﬁduciary obligation,3 and economists have credited
1. See infra section I.A.1.
2. See infra section I.A.1.
3. See, e.g., Joel Seligman, The New Corporate Law, 59 Brook. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1993)
(describing the duty of loyalty as the “most important ﬁduciary duty of corporate officers
and directors”); 1 William Campbell Ries, Regulation of Investment Management and
Fiduciary Services § 11:18, Westlaw (database updated July 2016) (noting loyalty as “the
most important duty which arises within the context of ﬁduciary relationships”); see also
infra note 52. The centrality of the duty of loyalty in Anglo-American corporate law goes
back at least to the mid-nineteenth century English case of Aberdeen Ry. v. Blaikie Bros.
(1854), 2 Eq. Rep. 1281. See generally David Kershaw, The Path of Corporate Fiduciary
Law, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 395, 428–33 (2012) (discussing Aberdeen Railway and its progeny).
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it with facilitating efficient corporate stewardship and catalyzing
investment and entrepreneurship.4 Indeed, a well-known literature in law
and ﬁnance has documented the beneﬁcial role that credible conﬂict-ofinterest management plays in promoting company value,5 vibrant capital
markets,6 and ﬁrm longevity.7 The duty of loyalty is also notable because
of its historically inveterate and unyielding nature: While much of
corporate law consists of “default rules” that parties may freely alter, the
duty of loyalty is widely perceived as “immutable”—immune to private
efforts to dilute, tailor, or eliminate it.8
That perception is no longer true. Beginning in 2000, Delaware
dramatically departed from tradition, amending its statutes to enable
corporations to waive a critical component of loyalty—the corporate
opportunities doctrine—which forbids corporate ﬁduciaries from appropriating new business prospects for themselves without ﬁrst offering
The duty of loyalty has also been the object of some of legal rhetoric’s most celebrated
passages. See, e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (describing loyalty
as demanding a “duty of the ﬁnest loyalty,” far “stricter than the morals of the market
place,” “[n]ot honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive”).
4. Brian R. Cheffins, Does Law Matter? The Separation of Ownership and Control
in the United Kingdom, 30 J. Legal Stud. 459, 464 (2001) (“A director’s duty of loyalty is
another type of legal rule that can help to provide a protective environment for investors
[because] . . . managerial self-dealing will potentially constitute breaches of duty.”); Simon
Johnson, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Tunneling, 90
Am. Econ. Rev. 22, 27 (2000) (discussing how the duties of loyalty and care are important
in protecting minority shareholder rights, which promotes the development of capital
markets); cf. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (discussing the
duties owed to minority shareholders); Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand:
The Deﬁning Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 Geo. L.J. 629, 634 (2010) (“[I]t
is essential that directors take their responsibilities seriously by actually trying to manage
the corporation in a manner advantageous to the stockholders.”).
5. See, e.g., Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J.
Econ. 107, 121–44 (2003) (providing evidence of a positive relationship between investor
protection and returns, value, and operating performance).
6. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. Pol. Econ. 1113, 1152
(1998).
7. Id. (discussing the connection between investor protection, developed debt and
equity markets, and economic growth).
8. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Optimal Defaults for Corporate Law
Evolution, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 489, 496 n.16 (2002) (providing “the duty of loyalty of
corporate directors” as an example of mandatory corporate governance regulation);
Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 542, 551–53 (1990) (citing self-dealing rules as one example of mandatory law);
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1461, 1486
(1989) (arguing self-dealing rules are “largely mandatory, at least for publicly held
corporations”); Marcel Kahan, The Qualiﬁed Case Against Mandatory Terms in Bonds, 89
Nw. U. L. Rev. 565, 607 n.164 (1995) (claiming the rules on self-dealing by managers are
mandatory); Randall S. Thomas, What Is Corporate Law’s Place in Promoting Societal
Welfare?: An Essay in Honor of Professor William Klein, 2 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 135, 139
(2005) (stating self-dealing rules are mandatory for public corporations); Jill E. Fisch,
Picking a Winner, 20 J. Corp. L. 451, 458 (1995) (reviewing Roberta Romano, The Genius
of American Corporate Law (1993)).
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them to the company.9 From that moment forward, Delaware corporations and managers became free to contract out of a signiﬁcant portion
of the duty of loyalty.10 In the ensuing years, eight other states have
followed Delaware’s lead, granting their own incorporated entities the
statutory authority to execute corporate opportunity waivers (COWs).11
The Corporate Laws Committee of the American Bar Association (ABA)
has also recently proposed amending the Model Business Corporation
Act to permit advance waivers of corporate opportunities.12
The reform movement sparked by Delaware represents a signiﬁcant
departure from long-settled understanding and common law tradition—
a departure that concerns a basic tenet of company law. It is thus
surprising that no signiﬁcant study to date has empirically assessed ﬁrms’
responses to these reforms (save for anecdotal accounts suggesting that
there has been little reaction13). This Article endeavors to ﬁll this void,
presenting what appears to be the ﬁrst broad empirical assessment
of how public companies have responded to the statutory reforms,14
and developing a broader conceptual and theoretical account to predict
and explain that response.15
Based on an extensive data set of U.S. public companies’ ﬁlings with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), we isolated over 10,000
unique disclosures that were plausible COWs. We then reﬁned these data
in two ways. First, we manually coded a large subset along a variety of
dimensions pertaining to the existence, scope, reach, and location of a
waiver. Second, we used our hand-coded sample to train a machinelearning algorithm, thereby extending our coding protocol to the entire
population of candidate documents.16 In contrast to the conventional
9. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 122(17) (2017) (codifying this amendment); infra
section I.B.2.
10. See infra sections I.B.2–.3.
11. Kan. Stat. Ann. 17-6102(17) (2014); Md. Code Ann., Corps. & Ass’ns § 2-103(15)
(LexisNexis 2014); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 351.385(16) (2016); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 78.070(8) (2007);
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:3-1(q) (West 2016); Okla. Stat. tit. 18, § 1016(17) (2001); Tex. Bus.
Orgs. Code Ann. § 2.101(21) (West 2012); Wash. Rev. Code § 23B.02.020(5)(k) (2016);
see also infra section I.B.4.
12. See Comm. on Corp. Laws, ABA Bus. Law Section, Changes in the Model Business Corporations Act—Proposed Amendments to Sections 2.02 and 8.70 (and Related
Changes to Sections 1.43, 8.31, and 8.60) Permitting Advance Action to Limit or Eliminate
Duties Regarding Business Opportunity, 69 Bus. Law. 717, 721–24, 727–31 (2014).
13. See, e.g., Christopher E. Austin & David I. Gottlieb, Renouncing Corporate
Opportunities in Spin-offs, Carve-out IPOs and Private Equity Investments, VC Experts:
Buzz, http://vcexperts.com/buzz_articles/320 [http://perma.cc/K79C-7V6T] (last visited
Jan. 30, 2017) (“Since the enactment of Section 122(17), it appears that only a small
number of corporations have gone public with or adopted corporate opportunity
provisions in their charters.”).
14. See infra Part III.
15. See infra Part II.
16. For details on our predictive coding methodology, see Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric
Talley, A Machine Learning Classiﬁer for Corporate Opportunity Waivers (Columbia Law
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wisdom, we ﬁnd that hundreds of public corporations in our sample—
and well over one thousand in the population—have disclosed or
executed waivers,17 with terms that apply broadly across both managerial
ranks and categorical domains.18 This Article thus establishes a central
empirical fact that is an important baseline for further discussion: Public
companies have an enormous appetite for tailoring the duty of loyalty when freed
to do so.
Alongside these empirical ﬁndings, this Article takes on several
fundamental questions raised by widespread adoption of waivers of
corporate opportunities: Why would a corporation ever choose to restrict
the reach of the duty of loyalty? What form will the optimal allocation of
corporate opportunities plausibly take in different companies? Under
what conditions would such waivers be valuable to shareholders, even as
such waivers constrain the ﬁduciary duties owed to shareholders?
Delaware’s seventeen-year statutory experiment also provides a unique
opportunity to revisit some foundational issues in corporate law with a
fresh perspective. Indeed, there is a vigorous, decades-old debate that
asks whether any of corporate law’s rules should be mandatory, or
whether parties instead should be free to contract out of every governance requirement as they already can from most.19 Does enlarging the
contracting space for ﬁduciary duties result in greater efficiencies, or
does it instead result in unchecked opportunism? There is also a
signiﬁcant set of issues involving whether corporations actually make use
of the freedom frequently given them by corporate law to replace default
rules and whether, when they do so, it serves shareholders’ interests.20
This Article argues that there are, in fact, several plausible economic
rationales for a corporation to embrace a COW for the sake of shareholder value. Indeed, in the years leading up to Delaware’s initial reform,
a growing chorus of critics argued that the exacting requirements of the
duty of loyalty had begun to impede corporations’ ability to raise capital,
build efficient investor bases, and secure optimal management arrange-

Sch., Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 553, 2016),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2849491 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
17. We note that the vast majority—but not all—of the disclosures in our data set
come from publicly traded companies. See infra sections III.A–.B. Our data set deems an
issuer to have “executed” a COW if it discloses either (1) a representation that it has
executed one; or (2) an operative provision in a legal document that purports to waive the
corporate opportunities doctrine.
18. See infra section III.B.
19. See infra notes 103–106, 206 and accompanying text (discussing the Delaware
Court of Chancery’s treatment of an early attempt at contracting out of the corporate
opportunities doctrine and noting a foundational question in corporate law is whether
corporations will “adopt optimal corporate governance structures on their own accord”).
20. See infra section II.B.4 (highlighting the possibility that permitting corporations
to tailor a nebulous standard provided by the common law may lead to a more efficient
legal framework).
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ments.21 This claim was based in part on the recognition that many thenemerging sources of capital, such as private equity, venture capital, or
spin-off transactions, may subject their ﬁnancial sponsors to ﬁduciary
duties in profound conﬂict with either their larger business plans or with
ﬁduciary obligations they owe to other business entities.22 Absent the
contractual ability to clarify ownership rights regarding new business
opportunities, it is difficult to see how such capital structures could stably
persist within the standard corporate arrangement.
Consider, for example, one of the issuers in our database: Prosper
Marketplace, Inc., the ﬁrst and still one of the largest peer-to-peer
lenders.23 The waiver that Prosper adopted in its charter covered any
member of Prosper’s board who was not also an employee.24 The four
outside directors in place at the time of the company’s public ﬁling (and
a majority of the board) worked for ﬁnancial ﬁrms—three of them in
venture capital—and at that point served as directors for at least fourteen
other companies, including another online commercial market.25 As a
risky entrepreneurial start-up, Prosper was an ideal candidate for the venture capital ﬁnancing model. Yet it is difficult to see how those outside
directors could avoid intractable ﬁduciary conﬂicts without ﬁrst securing
waivers deﬁning the boundaries of their loyalty obligations across different companies.26
That said, simply because there are plausible conditions under
which COWs could enhance shareholder welfare, it does not follow that
the ﬁrms actually adopting waivers satisfy those conditions. Our empirical
analysis provides insights into this question as well. We ﬁnd that COW
adopters are, on average, reasonably established ﬁrms with moderate-to21. See infra section I.B.2.
22. See infra notes 109–113 and accompanying text. That said, prior to the reform,
the Delaware Chancery Court took a particularly dim view of the enforceability of such
contractual clariﬁcations. See Siegman v. Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., No. 9477, 1989 WL 48746,
at *8 (Del. Ch. May 30, 1989) (denying defendants’ motion to dismiss on the grounds that
there was “at least one plausible state of facts” in which the provision at issue “would
arguably operate to eliminate or limit the directors’ liability for breach of their duty of
loyalty”).
23. Benjamin Lo, It Ain’t Broke: The Case For Continued SEC Regulation of P2P
Lending, 6 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. Online 87, 88 (2016), http://www.hblr.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/08/B.-Lo_Regulation-of-P2P-Lending.pdf [http://perma.cc/HG36-BSPY].
24. See Prosper Marketplace, Inc., Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation of Prosper Marketplace, Inc. (Form S-1, exh. 3.1) (Oct. 30, 2007),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1416265/000110465907078072/a07-27421_
1ex3d1.htm [http://perma.cc/7PEZ-4GD3].
25. See Prosper Marketplace, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 23–24 (Oct.
30, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1416265/000110465907078072/a0727421_1s1.htm [http://perma.cc/P9WM-37DF] (discussing outside directors’ other managerial roles).
26. For those who followed the well-known litigation in In re Trados Inc. S’holder
Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 40–41 (Del. Ch. 2013), Prosper suggests a number of possibly instructive
analogies.
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high asset values.27 They typically generate sizeable revenues, and they
tend to deliver larger overall market returns to their capital investors by
comparison to other public companies.28 Delaware corporations are
overrepresented,29 as are ﬁrms in industries in which diversiﬁed, active
investments across multiple portfolio companies are the norm (such as
oil and gas).30 As a descriptive matter, then, it does not appear that
companies that execute waivers are systematically the unscrupulous
bottom feeders of the corporate ecosystem. To the contrary, they
appear—by and large—to be healthy, growing, and proﬁtable business
organizations.
In addition to these descriptive statistics, this Article further assesses
whether the adoption of a waiver tends to add or dilute value on the
margin by analyzing market reactions to issuers’ ﬁrst public disclosure of
a COW.31 Our event-study analysis reveals that market reactions appear to
be favorable, resulting in an average positive abnormal stock return
hovering around one percent in the days immediately surrounding the
announcement date.32 While suggestive, the relationship is generally not
statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels, underlining the need for
additional future research. This positive reception is more pronounced
for Delaware corporations and for those with asset values just below $1
billion.33 Market response does not seem sensitive, in contrast, to whether
the waiver also covers officers or dominant shareholders, nor does it
appear to vary depending on whether the COW was adopted in a proposed charter amendment, a board-promulgated resolution, or something else.34 In addition, we demonstrate that ﬁrms incorporated in the
nine states embracing Delaware-style reform have experienced positive
abnormal stock-price returns on and around the date that such reforms
became inevitable.35 All told, these ﬁndings suggest not only that public
companies have embraced their newfound liberty to tailor the ﬁduciary
duty of loyalty but also that they have done so in ways that shareholders
welcome (or at least do not disfavor). Our ﬁndings are also pertinent to
ongoing debates about shareholder activism, the appropriate role of “constituency” directors, and whether the delineation of such roles should be
subject to immutable rules or left up to the companies themselves.36
27. See infra Table 6.
28. See infra Table 6.
29. See infra Table 5.
30. See infra notes 258–259 and accompanying text.
31. See infra section III.D.
32. See infra Table 7.
33. See infra Table 8.
34. See infra Table 8.
35. See infra Figure 6.
36. See, e.g., J. Travis Laster & John Mark Zeberkiewicz, The Rights and Duties of
Blockholder Directors, 70 Bus. Law. 33, 49–50 (2015) (arguing constituency directors
should all be compelled to pursue long-term value for shareholders).
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Several caveats warrant attention before proceeding. First, this Article’s
study is limited to waiver disclosures contained in SEC ﬁlings. This data
source imposes some unavoidable constraints. Most obviously, because
privately held ﬁrms are far less likely to be SEC reporting entities, the observed disclosures skew towards publicly traded companies. In addition,
the statutory provisions permitting COWs tend to grant wide latitude to
companies about how and where they promulgate a waiver, and thus
even for public companies, a waiver could be buried in any number of
public ﬁlings. While it is important to remain mindful of these
limitations, we note that a signiﬁcant fraction of our data set does
include private companies, including newly spun-off entities and private
companies with public debt. Moreover, the protocol we designed for
identifying candidate waivers casts a deliberately wide net, combing
through the entire universe of SEC ﬁlings with search criteria designed
deliberately to capture a large fraction of “false positive” candidates—a
population we could later winnow using sampling, manual coding, and
machine-learning techniques.37
Second, in practice, the disclosure of a COW is frequently “bundled”
with other disclosures (such as an announced spin-off, carve-out, significant investment, or reorganization). It is no doubt possible—and perhaps
likely—that the market’s reception of a COW is really an amalgamated
reaction to the totality of contemporaneous disclosures. Failing to
account for such confounding variables, one might argue, can lead to
spurious conclusions about the market response to waivers in particular.
Although this is an important concern, the appropriate response is not
clear. Proponents of Delaware’s reform maintained that an enforceable
COW is a critical precondition for the very transactions that now typically
accompany it. To the extent that this claim is valid, it would be
inappropriate not to analyze the COW alongside the other bundled
disclosures it facilitates. Nevertheless, as a robustness check, we also
exploit the time-lagged implementation of COW reforms at the state
level, which started with Delaware and spread to eight other states over
time. We similarly ﬁnd evidence of a positive market response to passage
of a COW reform among issuers incorporated inside the reforming
jurisdiction.38
Third, it is important to acknowledge that even if COWs help
augment shareholder welfare, it need not follow that other corporate
constituencies beneﬁt as well (if at all). In particular, a recent literature
in antitrust economics has begun systematically to document the rise of
“horizontal” ownership structures in which a common investor holds
appreciable equity across several ostensibly competing ﬁrms (often with

37. See infra section III.A.
38. See infra Figure 6.
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board representation).39 Such practices raise legitimate concerns that the
common shareholder will help orchestrate anticompetitive coordination
by the ﬁrms against their customers, employees, or trading partners. The
ready availability of a COW may further exacerbate this problem, by
permitting the common shareholder to choreograph collusion behind
the scenes, with little fear of litigation risk from minority shareholders.
Such concerns seem entirely plausible in our data: About one quarter of
the waivers in the event-study sample (and about half in the full
sample40) extend protection to certain of the issuer’s shareholders.41
Finally, most statutes enabling companies to execute COWs
(including Delaware’s) also subject that decision to a “back door” duty of
loyalty analysis.42 For example, if an interested director, officer, or
dominant shareholder were to use her domination of the board to force
through a self-serving COW, then courts could invalidate the promulgation of the waiver itself as self-dealing. The issuers embracing waivers
within our data set have done so against the backdrop of this liability
exposure—one animated, ironically enough, by a lingering vestige of
immutability within the duty of loyalty. Thus, one must be careful before
using this study to draw inferences about the broader merits of default
versus mandatory rules.
The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows. Part I revisits the
broad contours of ﬁduciary duties, providing a brief overview of the duty
of loyalty and the corporate opportunities doctrine. It also traces the
evolution of COWs, from prereform waiver efforts, to their skeptical
reception by Delaware’s courts, to the enactment of the Delaware
reforms and related statutes, and ﬁnally to subsequent litigation addressing waivers. Part II lays out a conceptual framework and model of
efficient contracting over corporate opportunities in order to capture the
contexts in which a COW would be value enhancing and the form it
would plausibly take. Part III describes the empirical methodology
behind our data set, offering a series of descriptive statistics about both
the structure of COWs and the types of companies embracing them. Part
III also reports on a series of event studies documenting positive market
reactions to companies’ ﬁrst disclosure of a COW. Part IV discusses the
broader legal and policy implications of this analysis.
39. See José Azar et al., Anti-Competitive Effects of Common Ownership 12–26 (Ross
Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 1235, 2016) [hereinafter Azar et al., Anti-Competitive
Effects], http://ssrn.com/abstract=2427345 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (ﬁnding evidence of common-ownership structures in the airline industry and examining the
effects of these ownership structures on ticket prices); see also Einer Elhauge, Horizontal
Shareholding, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 1267, 1273–78 (2016) (reviewing the literature on “horizontal shareholding”).
40. Infra Table 4.
41. Infra Table 8.
42. For a general discussion of this limitation (which appears in the statutory synopsis
but not the statute itself), see infra section I.B.2.
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I. REVISITING THE DUTY OF LOYALTY
To provide legal background to the theoretical and empirical
enterprise that follows, this Part gives an overview of the duty of loyalty
and corporate opportunities doctrine (COD). Section I.A explores the
broad doctrinal contours, while section I.B turns to the process by which
Delaware and other states implemented statutory reforms empowering
corporations to execute COWs.
A.

Fiduciary Law and the Corporate Opportunities Doctrine

1. Fiduciary Duties and the Duty of Loyalty. — Corporate ﬁduciaries—
the officers who manage a company’s daily operations, the directors who
wield ultimate decisionmaking authority, and the dominant shareholders
who possess swing voting power—exercise control over a vast amount of
social resources on behalf of corporations’ ultimate owners, their
shareholders.43 Among the law’s principal tools for ensuring that
corporate ﬁduciaries serve the interests of all of a corporation’s owners
faithfully and competently are the ﬁduciary duties of loyalty and care.
The duty of care mandates that corporate ﬁduciaries exercise informed business judgment in their stewardship of the company, imposing
liability if a ﬁduciary acts (or fails to act) without ﬁrst being adequately
informed.44 While this duty could conceivably reach almost any major
decision by corporate decisionmakers, a wide variety of judicial and
private limitations cabin its scope. Alongside the famous defendantfriendly “business judgment rule,”45 corporations are permitted to insure
their directors and officers against breaches of the duty of care and to
indemnify their directors for expenses incurred in connection with
defending against allegations of breaches.46 Lastly, Delaware and the vast
majority of other states allow parties to contract around the duty of care
in various respects. For instance, since the 1980s, almost all states have
permitted a corporation to adopt a charter provision limiting or eliminating the personal liability of corporate directors for breaching the duty of
care.47 Public companies regularly execute such exoneration provisions.48
43. See Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 976–77 (Del. 1977) (noting that under
Delaware law, officers, directors, and controlling shareholders are corporate ﬁduciaries);
cf. Principles of Corp. Governance: Analysis and Recommendations §§ 3.01–.02 (Am. Law
Inst. 1994) (describing the signiﬁcant powers held by corporate officers and directors).
44. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872–73 (Del. 1985).
45. The business judgment rule is a “presumption that in making a business decision
the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.” Aronson v. Lewis, 473
A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
46. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 145(a)–(g) (2017).
47. See id. § 102(b)(7) (empowering corporations to eliminate “the personal liability
of a director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of
ﬁduciary duty as a director”); William T. Allen & Reinier Kraakman, Commentaries and
Cases on the Law of Business Organization 229–30, 246 (5th ed. 2016).
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The duty of loyalty prohibits ﬁduciaries from beneﬁting improperly
from ﬁnancial conﬂicts of interest.49 In stark contrast to the duty of care,
loyalty has traditionally been immutable. The Delaware statute that
enables corporate charters to limit or eliminate directors’ monetary
liability for breaches of ﬁduciary duty, for example, expressly excludes
the duty of loyalty from its reach.50 Moreover, unlike with the duty of
care, the deferential business judgment rule is also inapplicable to
alleged breaches of loyalty.51 Loyalty’s traditionally mandatory character
is part of why commentators have widely held the duty to be “the most
important duty which arises within the context of fiduciary relationships”52 as well as the subject of most ﬁduciary litigation.53
The duty of loyalty requires ﬁduciaries to “exercise their authority in
a good-faith attempt to advance corporate purposes.”54 While there is an
affirmative dimension to this duty, its normal role is to bar self-interested
action by officers or directors, which involves a conﬂict of interest with
the corporation itself.55 Perhaps the most colorful summary of the duty of
loyalty is still the seminal opinion of Meinhard v. Salmon—a widely
adopted and cited case56 involving a contested business opportunity of an
48. See Holger Spamann, Monetary Liability for Breach of the Duty of Care?, 8 J.
Legal Analysis 337, 338 (2016).
49. Allen & Kraakman, supra note 47, at 283 (“[I]nterested transactions are
regulated ﬁrst and foremost by the ﬁduciary duty of loyalty.”).
50. See tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (speciﬁcally precluding a corporate charter from
eliminating or limiting director liability “[f]or any breach of the director’s duty of loyalty
to the corporation or its stockholders”). A small number of states’ corporate law may
differ from Delaware in this respect. Nevada, for example, seems devoted to developing a
niche as a near “liability-free” jurisdiction for managers. Michal Barzuza, Market
Segmentation: The Rise of Nevada as a Liability-Free Jurisdiction, 98 Va. L. Rev. 935, 947–
58 (2012). Under Nevada law, the default rule provides for no liability for a breach of the
duty of loyalty, absent “intentional misconduct, fraud or a knowing violation of law.” Nev.
Rev. Stat. § 78.138(7) (2003).
51. See Continuing Creditors’ Comm. of Star Telecomm., Inc. v. Edgecomb, 385 F.
Supp. 2d 449, 462 (D. Del. 2004) (“If a defendant does not breach his duty of loyalty to
the company, he is permitted to rely on the business judgment rule . . . .”).
52. 1 Ries, supra note 3, § 11:18; see also Frances S. Fendler, Losing Faith: Limited
Liability Companies in Arkansas and the Fiduciary Duties of Loyalty and Good Faith, 31 U.
Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 245, 259 (2009) (“The duty of loyalty is preeminent in the
constellation of the ﬁduciary duties recognized by common law.”); Thomas M. Griffin,
Note, Investing Labor Union Pension Funds in Workers: How ERISA and the Common
Law Trust May Beneﬁt Labor by Economically Targeting Investment, 32 Suffolk U. L. Rev.
11, 22 (1998) (“Preeminent among the ﬁduciary duties is the duty of loyalty.”); supra note
3 (collecting several sources that note the importance of the duty of loyalty).
53. See Allen & Kraakman, supra note 47, at 229.
54. Id.; cf. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872–73 (Del. 1985) (contrasting the
duty of loyalty with the duty of care).
55. Allen & Kraakman, supra note 47, at 283.
56. See, e.g., NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329–30 (1981) (citing Meinhard
as to the “uncompromising rigidity” of ﬁduciary obligation); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503,
515 (Del. 1939) (citing Meinhard in characterizing ﬁduciary standards as requiring more
than “the morals of the market place”); In re Galasso, 978 N.E.2d 1254, 1257 (N.Y. 2012)
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unincorporated partnership.57 Defendant Walter Salmon and plaintiff
Morton Meinhard entered a joint venture to lease and improve a
Manhattan hotel, which ultimately proved quite successful.58 As a result
of the venture, Salmon (the active manager) came to owe ﬁduciary
duties to Meinhard (a largely silent partner).59 Near the end of the lease,
the hotel’s new owner offered Salmon a successor lease to manage and
improve a vastly larger set of related properties.60 After the new lease had
been signed, Meinhard, who was previously uninformed about the lease
offer, discovered it and demanded a pro-rata share.61 A referee found
that Meinhard was owed such an interest in the expanded venture in a
fraction roughly proportionate to his interest in the ﬁrst one.62
In a majority opinion authored by Chief Judge Benjamin Cardozo,
the high court of New York affirmed.63 The opinion was quickly recognized as one for the ages. Judge Cardozo famously declared that ﬁduciary
ties demand a duty of “ﬁnest” and “undivided” loyalty, far “stricter than
the morals of the market place,” concluding instead that “[n]ot honesty
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of
behavior.”64 By adopting “[u]ncompromising rigidity” in their approach
to the duty of loyalty, the court articulated an aspiration that ﬁduciaries’
conduct would be “kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd.”65
The broad language of Meinhard and similar cases becomes concrete in
the various forms of managerial conduct regulated by the duty of loyalty,
including transactions between a corporation and its directors, selfdealing, control transactions, and executive compensation. That said, this
Article’s focus will be trained on—as was Chief Judge Cardozo’s—the
allocation of new business opportunities between the firm and the ﬁduciary.
2. The Corporate Opportunities Doctrine. — The COD is a key
component of the duty of loyalty.66 The basic idea of the COD is that
(citing Meinhard for the content of ﬁduciary obligation); In re Estate of Wallens, 877
N.E.2d 960, 962 (N.Y. 2007) (citing Meinhard for the proposition that ﬁduciary obligation
involves “the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive”).
57. 164 N.E. 545, 546–47 (N.Y. 1928).
58. Id. at 545–46.
59. Id. at 546.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See id. at 549.
64. Id. at 546 (emphasis punctiliously added).
65. Id. (emphasis added).
66. In re Cumberland Farms, Inc., 249 B.R. 341, 349 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2000)
(“Perhaps the most common instance of breach of a director’s duty of loyalty is
misappropriation of a corporate opportunity.”), aff’d sub nom. Haseotes v. Cumberland
Farms, Inc., 257 B.R. 691 (D. Mass. 2001), aff’d sub nom. In re Cumberland Farms, Inc.,
284 F.3d 216 (1st Cir. 2002); see also Myron T. Steele, Judicial Scrutiny of Fiduciary Duties
in Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 32 Del. J. Corp. L. 1,
10 (2007) (“Corporate opportunity ‘takings’ were, until [section 122(17)], a fundamental
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corporate ﬁduciaries may not appropriate for themselves a new business
opportunity that belongs to the corporation, unless they ﬁrst present it to
the corporation and receive authorization to pursue it personally.67 As a
result of the considerable amount of litigation arising from the COD and
its complexity, it has over time developed its own labyrinth of rules,
subcategories, standards, and tests.
The Delaware cases of Guth v. Loft 68 and Broz v. Cellular Information
Systems, Inc.69 provide deﬁning benchmarks for the modern COD (both
inside and outside Delaware). The doctrine states that an officer or
director of a corporation usurps a business opportunity if:
(1) the corporation is ﬁnancially able to [undertake] the opportunity; (2) the opportunity is within the corporation’s line of
business; (3) the corporation has an interest or expectancy in
the opportunity; and (4) by [pursuing] the opportunity [personally], the corporate ﬁduciary will thereby be placed in a
position inimicable [sic] to his duties to the corporation.70
Courts engage in a fact-intensive inquiry to determine whether a given
ﬁduciary’s pursuit of a business opportunity was impermissible under this
multifactor test.71
A simpler way to think of the doctrine, however, is as a sequential
inquiry. The ﬁrst major question is whether a given business prospect
constitutes a bona ﬁde “corporate opportunity,” thereby posing a
genuine conﬂict of interest.72 A number of fairly involved tests are
employed by courts in determining whether a given business prospect is
a corporate opportunity.73 If the prospect is not a corporate opportunity,
focus in the development of the constraints imposed by the common law on ﬁduciaries
under the heading of the duty of loyalty.”).
67. See Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 511 (Del. 1939) (noting the circumstances under
which a corporate officer or director may not “seize” a corporate opportunity); 3 William
Meade Fletcher, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations § 862.05 (perm. ed., rev.
vol. 2010) (“A director is free to take a business opportunity for himself or herself once
the corporation has properly rejected the opportunity.”).
68. 5 A.2d 503.
69. 673 A.2d 148 (Del. 1996).
70. Id. at 155; see also Guth, 5 A.2d at 511. The same test continues to be employed
consistently. See, e.g., In re Riverstone Nat’l, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 9796-VCG, 2016
WL 4045411, at *8–9 (Del. Ch. July 28, 2016) (applying the test to hold that the plaintiff
adequately pled facts alleging that the directors of a cash-out merger target were not
disinterested, since the directors’ personal exposure to viable corporate opportunity
claims would be “obliterated” under the terms of the acquisition).
71. See, e.g., Broz, 673 A.2d at 151.
72. See Eric Talley, Turning Servile Opportunities to Gold: A Strategic Analysis of the
Corporate Opportunities Doctrine, 108 Yale L.J. 277, 288–89 (1998) (presenting a
summary algorithm for analyzing COD cases).
73. The three major tests are the “line-of-business” test, see, e.g., Guth, 5 A.2d at 511,
the “interest-or-expectancy” test, see, e.g., Lagarde v. Anniston Lime & Stone Co., 28 So.
199, 201 (Ala. 1900), and the “fairness” test, see, e.g., Durfee v. Durfee & Canning, Inc., 80
N.E.2d 522, 529 (Mass. 1948). Additionally, some courts have adopted a test created by the
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then a ﬁduciary does no wrong by simply pursuing it herself without
informing the corporation.74 If the prospect is a corporate opportunity,
though, then the appropriate course of action is to offer it to the
corporation.75 If the corporation properly rejects that opportunity—
paradigmatically, by a majority vote of disinterested directors—then the
ﬁduciary again does no harm by pursuing it, while if the corporation
does not reject it, the ﬁduciary is barred from pursuit of the prospect.76
There are also several affirmative defenses that materially shape the
contours of the COD. Thus, some courts have found ﬁduciaries not to
have usurped corporate opportunities because they encountered the
opportunity in their personal capacity;77 because the corporation
impliedly rejected the opportunity;78 and most importantly, because the
corporation was not able to pursue a given business prospect, perhaps
because the corporation’s ﬁnancial condition precluded it from doing
so.79 If even this stylized description of the COD sounds involved, that is
largely a reﬂection of the doctrine itself. The law’s attempt to regulate
fiduciaries’ independent pursuit of business opportunities has produced a
doctrine of startling complexity and unpredictability.80
Not only is the COD a heavily litigated81 and murky subspecies of the
duty of loyalty, but the form of misconduct it targets—the usurpation of
business opportunities—is also one of the most pernicious types of
American Law Institute. See, e.g., Ne. Harbor Golf Club, Inc. v. Harris, 661 A.2d 1146,
1150–52 (Me. 1995); Principles of Corp. Governance: Analysis and Recommendations
§§ 5.05, 5.12 (Am. Law Inst. 1994).
74. See Talley, supra note 72, at 287–88.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Cf. Weiss v. Kay Jewelry Stores, Inc., 470 F.2d 1259, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(recognizing the fact that an “opportunity . . . came to [the defendant] in his individual
capacity in a non-corporate matter lying outside the ﬁeld of his duties as a director” as
undermining the corporation’s corporate opportunity claim).
78. See, e.g., Lussier v. Mau-Van Dev., Inc., 667 P.2d 804, 813 (Haw. Ct. App. 1983)
(ﬁnding “implied consent by the shareholders”).
79. See, e.g., Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148, 155 (Del. 1996).
80. See Talley, supra note 72, at 279 n.2 (“[T]here has been much confusion about
the speciﬁc extent of [the ﬁduciary] duty when . . . it is contended that a ﬁduciary takes
for herself a corporate opportunity.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Ne. Harbor Golf Club, Inc. v. Harris, 661 A.2d 1146, 1148–49 (Me.
1945))); see also Miller v. Miller, 222 N.W.2d 71, 79 (Minn. 1974) (“We have searched the
case law and commentary in vain for an all-inclusive or ‘critical’ test or standard by which a
wrongful appropriation can be determined and are persuaded that the doctrine is not
capable of precise definition.”); Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Law §7.6.2, at 244–45
(1986) (“The traditional tests are extremely ambiguous and uncertain in their application.”).
81. A Westlaw search found 8,679 cases involving the COD. Westlaw, http://
westlaw.com (ﬁlter search by “All States” and “All Federal”; then search in search bar for
“corporate /s opportunit!”) (last visited Mar. 13, 2017). For one example arising in the
bankruptcy context, see In re Cumberland Farms, Inc., 249 B.R. 341, 349–54 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 2000), aff’d sub nom. Haseotes v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 257 B.R. 691 (D. Mass.
2001), aff’d sub nom. In re Cumberland Farms, Inc., 284 F.3d 216 (1st Cir. 2002).

2017]

CORPORATE OPPORTUNITY WAIVERS

1089

agency costs. When the issue is one of who “owns” rights to a business
opportunity, then the interests of a corporation and its agent are not
merely misaligned; they may be completely at odds with each other. This
difficulty is compounded by the fact that the COD addresses not only
behavior that can reduce the value of a ﬁrm but also behavior in which a
ﬁduciary may usurp from its principal a new venture whose value
signiﬁcantly exceeds that of the corporation—as Meinhard v. Salmon82
illustrates. In Meinhard, the initial lease had been for $55,000, while the
new one was for $350,000 to $475,000; the initial building improvements
had been for $200,000, but were now to cost $3,000,000.83
B.

Evolution of the COW: A Brief History of Endeavors to Contract Out of the
Corporate Opportunities Doctrine

As noted in the previous section, the COD has always permitted
boards of directors to “reject” a corporate opportunity ex post—after it
has emerged and has been properly presented to the company by a
ﬁduciary interested in pursuing it personally.84 Just as with other forms of
independent board dispensation, however, this authorization power
historically did not apply to the prospective (or ex ante) waiver as to
opportunities or projects that had yet to arise. In fact, the notion that
parties might contract around (or out of) the duty of loyalty in advance
was traditionally considered anathema to foundational commitments of
corporate law, of which the duty of loyalty is one of few mandatory
components.85 For the most part, that is still how much of ﬁduciary law
operates (at least in Delaware corporations).86 But the late-twentieth
century bore witness to several early attempts to chisel the edges of the
status quo, at least insofar as it pertained to COWs. The judicial response
82. 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
83. Id. at 546–47.
84. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate
Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1618, 1649 (1989) (“American
courts clearly have been hostile to most attempts to exculpate with respect to the duty of
loyalty.”); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 Colum. L.
Rev. 1549, 1593 (1989) (“[O]pting out of ﬁduciary duties [is] particularly troublesome
and ultimately wrong-headed, especially for elements of the duty of loyalty.”).
86. Sutherland v. Sutherland, No. 2399-VCL, 2009 WL 857468, at *4 (Del. Ch. Mar.
23, 2009) (“While . . . a provision [limiting the ﬁduciary duty of loyalty] is permissible
under the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act and the Delaware Revised Uniform
Limited Partnership Act, where freedom of contract is the guiding and overriding
principle, it is expressly forbidden by the [Delaware corporate statute].”). There is some
variation among states, to be sure, but the nonwaivability of the duty of loyalty appears
relatively constant. See, e.g., Nev. Rev. Stat. § 78.138(7) (2003) (imposing a ﬂoor of liability
on directors for breach of ﬁduciary duty accompanied by intentional misconduct, fraud,
or a knowing violation of law); In re Amerco Derivative Litig., 252 P.3d 681, 704 (Nev.
2011) (reversing dismissal below and ﬁnding plaintiffs adequately pled a breached duty of
loyalty for corporate opportunity appropriation under Nevada law).
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to those early attempts, in turn, arguably catalyzed the subsequent
statutory innovations.
1. Primordial COWs. — Prior to the amendment of Delaware’s Code
in 2000, no speciﬁc statutory authority empowered companies explicitly
to contract out of the COD in advance.87 A company motivated to do so
in a legally legitimate fashion had few, if any, options, save a “nuclear”
one: A corporation could theoretically—in many states—attempt to cabin
the breadth of the doctrine by narrowing the purpose articulated in its
charter to speciﬁed lines of business, effectively using that scope
limitation to cabin the reach of all corporate activity, including the
COD.88 Such measures, however, invite a host of other ultra vires
challenges to corporate decisionmaking89—obstacles that have caused
limited-purpose provisions to be disfavored and exceedingly rare in
modern times.90 Indeed, conventional corporate charter wisdom has long
advocated extremely broad purpose provisions, authorizing the
corporation to engage in “any lawful act or activity” for which corporations may be organized under the applicable corporate statute.91
A more tailored form of carve out, on the other hand, had
speculative legal validity: Prior to 2000, Delaware statutes did not
explicitly permit (or even appear to contemplate) contracting out of the
COD.92 On the other hand, neither did Delaware law unambiguously
prohibit the practice. Towards the end of the twentieth century, several
corporations began to experiment with such provisions—experiments
that inevitably attracted legal challenges. Perhaps the best-known
example was the 1989 Delaware Chancery Court decision in Siegman v.
87. Indeed, as Siegman v. Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. noted—and we discuss shortly—the law
of Delaware positively prohibited such attempts to contract out of the COD. See No. 9477,
1989 WL 48746, at *7–8 (Del. Ch. May 30, 1989).
88. Cf. Zenichi Shishido, Conﬂicts of Interest and Fiduciary Duties in the Operation
of a Joint Venture, 39 Hastings L.J. 63, 94–95 (1987) (noting that a court could ﬁnd no
misappropriation of a corporate opportunity when that opportunity was “ultra vires”—
outside the scope of the corporation’s purposes).
89. See Michael A. Schaeftler, Clearing Away the Debris of the Ultra Vires Doctrine—
A Comparative Examination of U.S., European, and Israeli Law, 16 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus.
71, 80, 86 (1984) (examining the potential consequences of a narrow purpose clause,
including ultra vires suits and limits on corporate executives’ authority).
90. Id. at 88 (“[A] majority of U.S. corporations have purpose clauses which either
encompass every conceivable lawful business activity by means of boiler-plate language, or
state simply that the corporation may engage in any lawful activity.”).
91. See 1A Fletcher, supra note 67, § 91 (discussing the near ubiquity of general
purpose corporate statutes, including in the Model Business Corporations Act); see also 1
Marvin Hyman, Corporation Forms § 1:13, Westlaw (database updated Mar. 2017)
(“Present practice, which is permitted by most state statutes, is to simply include a
sentence providing that the corporation can engage in any other activity permitted by
law.”); id. § 1:16 (offering as standard form language for New York corporations the power
“[t]o engage in any lawful act or activity for which corporations may be organized under
the Business Corporation Law”).
92. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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Tri-Star Pictures, Inc.93 Siegman was a putative class action challenging a
proposed combination between Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. (“Tri-Star”),94
Coca-Cola, and Time. Under the terms of the contemplated transaction,
Tri-Star acquired the entertainment assets of Coca-Cola, and Coca-Cola
received a large number of shares of newly issued Tri-Star common
stock.95
The plaintiffs challenged the validity of several proposed amendments to Tri-Star’s certiﬁcate of incorporation (executed as part of the
combination). One such amendment purported to eliminate liability for
Tri-Star’s directors for breach of the duty of loyalty under speciﬁed
circumstances involving the appropriation of corporate opportunities.96
Another amendment provided that neither Coca-Cola nor Time, as signiﬁcant block stockholders of Tri-Star, would be liable for any breach of
ﬁduciary duty stemming from having pursued a corporate opportunity
belonging to Tri-Star.97 The business combination was approved by both
Tri-Star and Coca-Cola, and the proposed amendments were subsequently adopted by shareholders.98
The gravamen of the complaint centered on the director provision,
asserting that the COW purported to eliminate or limit liability in a way
that was simply impermissible under Delaware law. Speciﬁcally, plaintiffs
argued that section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law
(DGCL) did not permit elimination or restriction of directors’ liability
for breach of the duty of loyalty.99 The statute provides express
limitations on exoneration provisions and excludes any waiver “[f]or any
breach of the director’s duty of loyalty to the corporation or its
stockholders.”100 Effectively, the plaintiffs asserted that the COW
amendment purported to do exactly this: reduce the directors’ liability
exposure for a particular type of duty of loyalty breach (an appropriation
of corporate opportunities), a move that the plaintiffs argued

93. No. 9477, 1989 WL 48746 (Del. Ch. May 5, 1989); see also Senate Bill 363:
Original Synopsis, Del. Gen. Assembly, http://legis.delaware.gov/BillDetail?LegislationId=
10399 [http://perma.cc/NMW5-RXTJ] (last visited Jan. 31, 2017) (“The subsection is
intended to eliminate uncertainty regarding the power of a corporation to renounce
corporate opportunities in advance raised in Siegman v. Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. . . . .”).
94. When it formed in 1985, Tri-Star was the ﬁrst major new movie studio since RKO
was formed in 1927. Jennifer Holt, Empires of Entertainment: Media Industries and the
Politics of Deregulation, 1980-1996, at 45 (2011).
95. Siegman, 1989 WL 48746, at *1–2. Substantial portions of the opinion (denying
three motions to dismiss) are devoted to procedural issues, justiciability issues, unrelated
charter provisions, and other issues that are beyond our remit for current purposes. See
id. at *3–6, *9–12.
96. Id. at *7–8.
97. Id.
98. Id. at *2.
99. See id. at *7.
100. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2017).
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transgressed the immutable boundaries of section 102(b)(7).101 The
defendants countered that the provision was valid and enforceable under
Delaware law, and they moved to dismiss.102
Then-Vice Chancellor Jacobs sided with the plaintiffs, noting that
the appropriate judicial standard for a motion to dismiss in this context
“requires that the motion must be denied if under any plausible
construction or operation,” the COW “arguably would contravene”
Delaware law.103 Employing this analytical approach, Vice Chancellor
Jacobs determined that at least one plausible set of facts would—under
the articulated terms of the charter provision—eliminate or limit the
liability of Tri-Star directors for breach of their ﬁduciary duty of loyalty.104
Indeed, Vice Chancellor Jacobs envisioned a very general scenario as
violating section 102(b)(7): A director appropriates for herself or her
other employer a business opportunity that rightly belongs to Tri-Star but
had not been offered to that director in her capacity as a Tri-Star director
or in writing.105 Finding such a result to be impermissible under the
limits established by section 102(b)(7), Vice Chancellor Jacobs denied
the defendants’ motion to dismiss.106
2. Legalizing COWs in the Delaware General Corporation Law. — Siegman
substantially put to rest the question of how and when corporate
opportunities were waivable.107 Under any fair reading of the opinion,
the duty of loyalty was simply not contractible, be it through a corporate
governance provision, a board resolution, or through a contractual term.
In the ensuing decade, the Siegman opinion stayed in full force and was
101. See Siegman, 1989 WL 48746, at *7 (“Plaintiff contends that Article Sixth is
invalid as a matter of law, because it eliminates or restricts the directors’ liability to the
corporation or its shareholders for breaches of their ﬁduciary duty of loyalty, in violation
of 8 Del.C. § 102(b)(7).”).
102. See id. at *4, *7 (noting defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds that the
provision was “valid as a matter of law” and describing their arguments).
103. See id. at *7–8.
104. See id. at *8.
105. See id.
106. See id. As the Chancery Court put it, “Article Sixth would eliminate or limit the
liability of Tri-Star directors for breach of their ﬁduciary duty of loyalty—a result
proscribed by § 102(b)(7).” Id. It bears observing that Jacobs was more sympathetic to a
different contractual provision that purported to limit or eliminate directorial liability to
the fullest extent permitted by the DGCL in the event it were amended in the future. See
id. at *8–9. Here, Vice Chancellor Jacobs found that neither the statute nor its underlying
policy forbids such prospective planning in legislative enactments or amendments. See id.
107. There were precious few post-Siegman cases that squarely dealt with advance
COWs until after the amendment of the DGCL in 2000 (even though citations to the case
made occasional appearances in practitioner journals and law reviews). See, e.g.,
Theodore D. Moskowitz & Walter A. Effross, 23 Seton Hall L. Rev. 897, 916 & n.141 (1993)
(citing Siegman); infra note 108 and accompanying text (collecting cases that cite
Siegman). Thus, much of the practical wake of Siegman was the shadow it appears to have
cast over corporate conduct for the ensuing decade, an inference bolstered by the
legislative history of the ensuing reform. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
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rarely discussed by subsequent judicial opinions (inside or outside
Delaware).108
By the end of the twentieth century, however, market dynamics
began biting at the jurisprudential heels of the Siegman approach. The
dot-com era of the 1990s ushered in a wave of novel market-mediated
corporate structures, including spin-offs, partial IPOs, venture capital,
private equity, and equity carve-outs.109 Many of these innovations
resulted in extended families of corporate affiliates with partially
overlapping ownership, partially overlapping board membership, and
partially overlapping lines of business.110 Such structures, in turn, placed
considerable stress on the canonical “undivided-loyalty” model of
corporate opportunities. Any time a ﬁduciary’s duties extended to
multiple affiliated entities (as was increasingly frequent), she faced an
unwinnable Kobayashi-Maru scenario111 of carving up what was judicially
indivisible: her loyalty. Consider, for example, the conundrum of
allocating corporate opportunities between a parent and its partially
owned subsidiary, both operating in a similar industry and sharing
common board members and officers. How might those overlapping
ﬁduciaries (or for that matter, the parent, as the dominant shareholder
of the subsidiary) comply with their simultaneous duties of “undivided
loyalty” between the two ﬁrms? How should they go about allocating
corporate opportunities?
These questions are profound and probably unanswerable. Scholars
have long recognized that the undivided-loyalty model is simply not well

108. The opinions that did cite Siegman generally did so for issues unrelated to the
COD. See, e.g., Katz v. Pels, 774 F. Supp. 121, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Ryan v. Aetna Life Ins.,
765 F. Supp. 133, 138 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., Litig., 634 A.2d 319, 325
(Del. 1993); Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 888 (Del. Ch. 1999); Levine
v. Smith, No. 8833, 1989 WL 150784, at *6 n.5 (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 1989), aff’d, 591 A.2d 194
(Del. 1991); In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., Litig., No. 9477, 1989 WL 112740, at *1 (Del. Ch.
Sept. 26, 1989).
109. See, e.g., Karen M. Hogan & Gerard T. Olson, The Pricing of Equity Carve-Outs
During the 1990s, 27 J. Fin. Res. 521, 528 (2004) (showing growth of equity carve-outs in
the early 1990s); Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets
the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 Rev. Econ. Stud.
281, 286–95 (2003) (discussing the novel features of venture capital ﬁnancing contracts);
Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity, 23 J. Econ.
Persp. 121, 126 (2009).
110. See Hogan & Olson, supra note 109, at 529, 530 tbl.2, 535 tbl.5 (reporting
descriptive statistics related to “share overhang”—shared control of the parent and spunoff subsidiary—and its predictive effect on excess returns).
111. See, e.g., Janet D. Stemwedel, The Philosophy of Star Trek: The Kobayashi Maru,
No-Win Scenarios, And Ethical Leadership, Forbes (Aug. 23, 2015, 10:18 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/janetstemwedel/2015/08/23/the-philosophy-of-star-trekthe-kobayashi-maru-no-win-scenarios-and-ethical-leadership (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review).
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adapted for ﬁduciaries shared by two companies.112 In fact, the canonical
approach may be the least attractive from the parties’ perspectives, since a
time-honored prescription for conduct of “dual agents” under ﬁduciary
law is to disclose the corporate opportunity to both interested corporations, effectively encouraging the two to compete with one another for
the new business prospect.113 While such competition is no doubt
attractive to counterparties in the business opportunity (offering significant transactional surplus), it seems an unlikely governance feature for
augmenting the combined welfare of the ﬁduciary and the two beneﬁciaries of her duties.
Nevertheless, by the turn of the century, the corporate structures
described above had become increasingly common. Two high-stakes
cases during that era—Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc.114 and In re Digex, Inc.115—
help underscore the resulting challenges. Both cases focused centrally on
corporate opportunities claims made by shareholders of a controlled
subsidiary, asserting that the parent had usurped a corporate opportunity
related to an acquisition of the subsidiary.116 In both cases, the plaintiffs
alleged that the controller had commandeered takeover negotiations
with a third-party buyer, redirecting the buyer’s interest towards the
parent and away from the subsidiary, thereby ﬂeecing the subsidiary’s
minority shareholders of their impending control premium.117 In both
cases, the corporate opportunities claims either narrowly lost or were
substantially narrowed, under the theory that the prospective acquisition
deal was not a corporate opportunity since the parent possessed the
power (and the right) to use its voting shares to veto any proposed
transaction at the subsidiary level.118 Nevertheless, both opinions recog112. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 80, § 7.3, at 231–34 (summarizing case law and
characterizing two seemingly inconsistent “riddles” posed by alternative accepted
approaches to COD cases).
113. See, e.g., Energy Res. Corp. v. Porter, 438 N.E.2d 391, 394 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982)
(concluding a third party’s purported “refusal to deal” with a disfavored corporation was
not credible unless ﬁrst “adequately tested” by disclosing to the disfavored corporation so
as “to verify the unwillingness to deal”); Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 547 (N.Y.
1928) (“The trouble about [defendant’s] conduct is that he excluded his coadventurer
from any chance to compete, from any chance to enjoy the opportunity for beneﬁt that
had come to him alone by virtue of his agency. This chance, if nothing more, he was under
a duty to concede.”).
114. 676 A.2d 436 (Del. 1996).
115. 789 A.2d 1176 (Del. Ch. 2000).
116. See Thorpe, 676 A.2d at 438; Digex, 789 A.2d at 1178.
117. See Thorpe, 676 A.2d at 439; Digex, 789 A.2d at 1178.
118. See Thorpe, 676 A.2d at 443; Digex, 789 A.2d at 1190. In Thorpe, the Chancery
Court found (and the supreme court concurred) that a lack of disclosure by the
defendants to the plaintiff substantiated a formal breach of the COD. However, the court
found that because the controllers had the votes to block any alternative transaction,
plaintiffs were not entitled to transactional damages and instead were limited to reliance
damages associated with initial negotiations with the third-party acquirer. See Thorpe, 676
A.2d at 445.
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nized the generic and intractable challenges posed by corporate
opportunities claims in cases involving ownership–board–industry
overlap.119 The cases served up a sobering reminder of the uncomfortable indeterminacy of corporate opportunity claims when ﬁrms have
overlapping dominant ownership or boards. They also made apparent
that there might be some value in allowing parties to prearrange how
they would divide property rights over corporate opportunities. Thus was
the stage set for a legal-reform push at the dawn of the twenty-ﬁrst
century.120
The wait was not long. In the summer of 2000, the Delaware
Assembly amended the state’s statutes to add subsection (17) to section
122 of the DGCL, explicitly permitting COWs.121 The codiﬁed location is
a curious one. Section 122 is a general and longstanding provision whose
purpose is to articulate a variety of powers possessed by Delaware
corporations.122 Many of these powers are fundamental (such as the right
to hold property, the right to enter contracts, and the right to sue and be
sued).123 The new subsection (17), however, was different and somewhat
sui generis, constituting the sole provision in the section that concerns
ﬁduciary duties. The subsection provides that a Delaware corporation has
the power to:
(17) Renounce, in its certiﬁcate of incorporation or by action of
its board of directors, any interest or expectancy of the corporation in, or in being offered an opportunity to participate in,
speciﬁed business opportunities or speciﬁed classes or categories
of business opportunities that are presented to the corporation or
one or more of its officers, directors or stockholders.124
The legislative synopsis accompanying the amendment further states:
The subsection is intended to eliminate uncertainty regarding
the power of a corporation to renounce corporate opportunities in advance raised in Siegman v. Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. It
permits the corporation to determine in advance whether a
speciﬁed business opportunity or class or category of business
opportunities is a corporate opportunity of the corporation
rather than to address such opportunities as they arise. The
subsection does not change the level of judicial scrutiny that will
119. See Thorpe, 676 A.2d at 442; Digex, 789 A.2d at 1193.
120. See Lewis S. Black, Jr. & Frederick H. Alexander, Analysis of the 2000
Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law, in Contests for Corporate
Control: Current Offensive & Defensive Strategies in M&A Transactions 729, 732–34
(2002) (providing contemporaneous commentary on section 122(17)’s enactment and
noting the sale by a parent of minority interests in a subsidiary as an important business
context affected by the statute’s adoption).
121. 72 Del. Laws 619 (2000).
122. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 122 (2017).
123. See id.; cf. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2012) (codifying many similar fundamental powers
for national banking associations).
124. tit. 8, § 122(17).
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apply to the renunciation of an interest or expectancy of the
corporation in a business opportunity, which will be determined
based on the common law of ﬁduciary duty, including the duty
of loyalty.125
Several aspects of the amendment and its synopsis warrant
elaboration. First, and most obviously, the synopsis makes clear that the
amendment was meant to repudiate the then-decade-old Siegman approach.
Indeed, the amendment speciﬁcally permits enforceable COWs under
Delaware law, a position that—both before and after Siegman—most had
considered untenable.
Second, the new section explicitly applies symmetrically to all
corporate ﬁduciaries, including officers, directors, and dominant or
controlling shareholders. By contrast, the statutory provision permitting
duty of care waivers is far narrower, applying only to monetary damages
claims against corporate directors;126 it does not extend to either injunctive relief of any kind or claims for monetary damages lodged against
officers or dominant shareholders. This asymmetry has been consistently
recognized by the Delaware courts (even if periodically scorned by
commentators).127
Third, consider the level of speciﬁcity required for a corporate
opportunities waiver to be effective under the statute. On its face, the
amendment requires a COW to be worded with some particularity,
identifying “speciﬁed business opportunities or speciﬁed classes or
125. Del. Gen. Assembly, supra note 93 (citation omitted); see also 72 Del. Laws at 619.
126. See tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (providing the certiﬁcate of incorporation can include
“[a] provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the corporation
or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of ﬁduciary duty as a director”).
127. Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 709 nn.36–37 (Del. 2009). Although several
commentators—including a former Delaware Vice Chancellor—have criticized this
asymmetry, it continues to persist. See, e.g., Stephen P. Lamb & Joseph Christensen, Duty
Follows Function: Two Approaches to Curing the Mismatch Between the Fiduciary Duties
and Potential Personal Liability of Corporate Officers, 26 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub.
Pol’y 45, 46 (2012) (stating section 102(b)(7)’s contribution to corporate law is
“incomplete” because “the Delaware Supreme Court held that officers owe the same
ﬁduciary duties as directors . . . but cannot be exculpated for the same class of ﬁduciary
breaches as directors”); see also Andrew D. Appleby & Matthew D. Montaigne, Three’s
Company: Stone v. Ritter and the Improper Characterization of Good Faith in the Fiduciary
Duty “Triad,” 62 Ark. L. Rev. 431, 469 (2009) (“While Gantler leaves officers extremely
vulnerable to Van Gorkom-like liability, the current ‘anti-executive social-political climate’
may preclude the courts or legislature from extending officers any section 102(b)(7)
protection.” (quoting Usha Rodrigues, Delaware v. The Feds on Officer Regulation,
Conglomerate (Feb. 4, 2009), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2009/02/delaware-v-the-fedson-officer-regulation.html [http://perma.cc/D8BJ-KNZL])); Dennis R. Honabach, Smith v. Van
Gorkom: Managerial Liability and Exculpatory Clauses—A Proposal to Fill the Gap of the
Missing Officer Protection, 45 Washburn L.J. 307, 307–08 (2006) (advocating extension of
protection to officers); Meghan Glaspy, Note, Delaware’s Gantler Decision: A Solution to
Corporate Corruption?, 12 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 289, 307 (2014) (arguing “there is no . . .
reason to hold officers to a higher standard” given that “officers and directors have the
same ﬁduciary duties”).
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categories of business opportunities” that would be subject to waiver.128
This construction appears in tension with an expansive, “blanket” waiver,
in which a corporation, say, disclaims all corporate opportunities, or even
a broad waiver purporting to disclaim all opportunities except a speciﬁed set
of carved out exceptions. In contractual parlance, the wording of the
section appears, at least facially, to suggest a type of sticky default rule that
does not invite corporations to invert or “ﬂip” the default, either in toto
or in substantial part.129
Fourth, consider the means and location for executing an effective
COW. The text of the section permits a waiver to be included in a
corporation’s charter, but it also allows a waiver to simply be adopted by
action of the board of directors. Bearing in mind that a charter
amendment cannot generally be promulgated exclusively by action of the
board once stock is sold,130 the portion that authorizes an action of the
board opens up tremendous latitude, permitting COWs to be couched in
a contract approved by the board, a board-promulgated bylaw (if the
board has such power under the charter),131 a board resolution, or any
other declarative action promulgated by the board. The fact that a COW
may be executed outside the charter context is notable, since the other
principal means by which corporations may waive ﬁduciary duties (the
duty of care) speciﬁcally requires a charter provision.132 Indeed, it was
the prohibition of waiving the duty of loyalty under section 102(b)(7)
that formed the basis of the Siegman opinion in the ﬁrst place.133 Section
122(17) is thus in some conspicuous ways broader than conventional
waivers of the duty of care.
Finally, while section 122(17) grants increased latitude for enforcing
valid COWs, the legislative synopsis notes that the initial adoption of a
COW is subject to traditional fiduciary principles—just as the renunciation
of an opportunity when it arises. Thus, should a ﬁnancially conﬂicted
board decide to adopt a COW without ﬁrst seeking to cleanse the decision through conventional means (such as a vote of disinterested directors or shareholders),134 then the very act of executing the COW could be

128. tit. 8, § 122(17).
129. As discussed below, however, a portion of the legislative synopsis casts some
doubt on the requirement of speciﬁcity for an effective COW. See infra text accompanying
note 146.
130. See tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) (requiring a shareholder vote for most charter amendments).
131. Section 109 of the DGCL allows the certiﬁcate of incorporation to grant the
board concurrent power to pass, amend, and repeal corporate bylaws. See id. § 109(a).
132. Id. § 102(b)(7).
133. See supra notes 99–104 and accompanying text.
134. See tit. 8, § 144.
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challenged under Delaware’s stringent entire fairness standard (and possibly invalidated).135
3. Subsequent Delaware Litigation. — The footprint of Delaware’s
statutory reform in case law and commentary has been surprisingly faint.
In the decade and a half since section 122(17) was promulgated, the
statute appears to have been invoked in only a single Delaware case and
in only a few secondary sources.136
The 2009 Delaware Chancery Court opinion in Wayne County
Employees’ Retirement System v. Corti 137 appears to be the only Delaware
opinion to date to engage the statutory framework for COWs explicitly
(although cursorily). Like Siegman, Corti was a purported shareholder
class action challenging a business combination involving a waiver of
corporate opportunities.138 The combination called for Vivendi S.A.
(Vivendi) to transfer its subsidiary, Vivendi Games, Inc., to Activision,
Inc. in return for newly issued shares of Activision and a post-closing
tender offer by Vivendi for up to half of Activision’s remaining shares.139
Together, Vivendi’s acquisition of shares through the business combination and back-end tender would result in Vivendi acquiring a majority
of Activision voting stock, which it then renamed Activision Blizzard.140
The charter of the surviving corporation (Activision Blizzard) included a
broadly-worded COW.141
135. Cf. Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 97 (Del. 2001) (describing the
enhanced entire fairness standard of scrutiny that applies to certain conﬂicted transactions
and requires “fair dealing and fair price”).
136. A small number of other cases discuss waivers ﬂeetingly but with no reference to
the DGCL. A Westlaw search for COWs after 2000 yielded eight cases and thirty-one
secondary sources. Westlaw, http://westlaw.com (ﬁlter search by “All States” and “All
Federal”; then search in search bar for “‘corporate opportunit!’ /10 waiv! and
DA(aft2000)”) (last visited Mar. 13, 2017). By contrast, the enabling statute for duty of
care waivers has been invoked in at least 269 cases and 358 secondary sources over that
same period. Id. (ﬁlter search by “All States” and “All Federal”; then search in search bar
for “(‘8 Del. C. s 102(b)(7)’) or (‘waive!’ /10 ‘duty #of care’) and DA(aft2000)”) (last
visited Mar. 13, 2017).
137. No. 3534-CC, 2009 WL 2219260, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009), aff’d, 996 A.2d
795 (Del. 2010).
138. See id. at *17.
139. Id. at *1.
140. Id.
141. The charter provision read:
In the event that a director or officer of the Corporation who is also a
director, officer or employee of Vivendi acquires knowledge of a
potential transaction or matter which may be a corporate opportunity
for both the Corporation and Vivendi (a “Mutual Corporate
Opportunity”), such director or officer shall to the fullest extent
permitted by law have fully satisﬁed and fulﬁlled his ﬁduciary duty with
respect to such Mutual Corporate Opportunity, and the Corporation to
the fullest extent permitted by law waives and renunciates [sic] any claim
that such Mutual Corporate Opportunity constituted a corporate
opportunity that should have been presented to the Corporation, if such
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Plaintiff—a shareholder of the target Activision—alleged, inter alia,
that the COW was invalid under Delaware law because it contravened
section 122(17)’s limitations through its sweeping language. The
provision, plaintiff contended, failed to specify explicitly which corporate
opportunities (or classes or categories thereof) the corporation was
renouncing as the statutory text arguably requires.142 Rather, the
provision utilized the opposite, holus-bolus grammatical construction,
categorically sweeping away all liability exposure with the exception of
opportunities that were expressly offered to Activision ﬁduciaries in their
capacity as such.143 In short, plaintiff averred, the Activision Blizzard
waiver fell outside the bounds authorized by section 122(17).
Chancellor Chandler remained uncowed, denying plaintiff’s motion
for a preliminary injunction of the contemplated transaction and holding that “[t]he mere existence of [the broadly worded COW] does not
threaten plaintiff with harm that justiﬁes expending judicial resources to
render a declaratory judgment on the issue of whether the corporate
opportunities allegedly renounced by [the COW] are sufficiently
‘speciﬁed.’”144 Any plausible harm to plaintiff due to the wording of the
waiver, Chancellor Chandler concluded, “is too remote and speculative
to justify rendering a declaratory judgment, and plaintiff is not entitled
to a declaratory judgment merely because it is able to conjure up
hypothetical situations in which the challenged provisions may be applied
contrary to Delaware law.”145 Ultimately, Chancellor Chandler took no
position on the question of whether such hypothetical situations might
actually arise down the road, in which case the Activision-Blizzard COW
might be invalidated under the statute. But any such claim would have to
wait for an actual disputed business opportunity.
It is unclear how the court might have wrestled with the Corti COW
had the case presented an actual contested business opportunity. While
director or officer acts in a manner consistent with the following policy:
a Mutual Corporate Opportunity offered to any person who is an officer
or director of the Corporation, and who is also an officer, director or
employee of Vivendi, shall belong to Vivendi, unless such Mutual
Corporate Opportunity was expressly offered to such person in his or
her capacity as a director or officer of the Corporation (an “Activision
Opportunity”), in which case such Activision Opportunity shall not be
pursued by Vivendi. In the event Vivendi decides to pursue any Mutual
Corporate Opportunity (other than an Activision Opportunity), then,
subject to any contractual restrictions on Vivendi with respect to
conﬁdentiality, Vivendi shall provide prompt written notice to the
Corporation of such decision.
Id. at *17. The Activision Blizzard COW’s text helps motivate some of our decisions in
coding the COW database detailed and summarized in the next section.
142. Id. at *1; cf. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 122(17) (2017) (referring only to “speciﬁed
business opportunities or speciﬁed classes or categories of business opportunities”).
143. Corti, 2009 WL 2219260, at *1.
144. Id. at *18.
145. Id. at *19.
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the text of section 122(17) could arguably favor plaintiff’s preferred
narrow construction, the legislative synopsis suggests that plaintiff’s position faces an uphill battle. The synopsis offers several characterizations of
how corporations’ power to renounce business opportunities in advance
might be used:
[C]ategories of business opportunities may be speciﬁed by any
manner of deﬁning or delineating business opportunities or the
corporation’s or any other party’s entitlement thereto or
interest therein, including, without limitation, by line or type of
business, identity of the originator of the business opportunity,
identity of the party or parties to or having an interest in the
business opportunity, identity of the recipient of the business
opportunity, periods of time or geographical location.146
After Corti, there appear to be no other opinions endeavoring to
interpret section 122(17). Although parties in a few post-Corti cases have
advanced theories touching on the applicability or scope of a purported
waiver, none of these opinions has discussed the section explicitly, and
each court either struck down the waiver argument on other grounds or
avoided it so as to shed little additional light on how courts will likely
apply section 122(17) in future Delaware cases.147
The paucity of published jurisprudence around COWs does not
imply, however, that all important legal questions pertaining to waivers
have been answered—far from it. One particularly intriguing question
pertains to the so-called “duty of good faith,” which entered the scene
years after section 122(17)’s promulgation.148 By all accounts, good faith
is thought to be immutable149 and a subspecies of the duty of loyalty

146. Del. Gen. Assembly, supra note 93; cf. 72 Del. Laws 619 (2000) (referring to
“speciﬁed business opportunities or speciﬁed classes or categories of business opportunities”).
147. One notable 2012 case that takes up the enforceability of a COW most directly is
Dweck v. Nasser, No. 1353-VCL, 2012 WL 161590 (Del. Ch. Jan. 18, 2012). In Dweck, the
court found that the CEO and a minority shareholder of a Delaware corporation had
appropriated a corporate opportunity in forming several competing children’s retail
businesses. See id. at *1. The defendant asserted that her conduct was permitted under a
waiver, but Vice Chancellor Laster disagreed, noting that the plaintiff and controlling
shareholder had never executed the purported waiver. See id. at *15. And, while the
defendant and the plaintiff had evidently executed a COW in the governance documents
of a separate company they had formed, Vice Chancellor Laster held that such a provision
was not binding on the ﬁduciaries of the instant corporation. See id. at *15–17. The court
never reached the issue of judicial construction of the COW against the statutory language
in section 122(17).
148. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 66 (Del. 2006)
(announcing the duty of good faith).
149. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 367 (Del. 2006)
(noting a “section 102(b)(7) provision . . . can exculpate directors from monetary liability
for a breach of the duty of care, but not for conduct that is not in good faith or a breach of
the duty of loyalty”).
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(rather than a freestanding ﬁduciary obligation).150 Moreover, under
Delaware jurisprudence, the good faith duty proscribes conduct that
harms the corporation and is motivated by a ﬁduciary’s “subjective bad
faith.”151 It seems entirely possible to characterize corporate opportunity
diversion as embodying precisely this type of deliberate bad faith, in
which the corporation is “harmed” when the ﬁduciary willfully deprives
it of a lucrative business opportunity. How might such an allegation
proceed if the corporation had also executed a COW that covered the
ﬁduciary? On the one hand, the waiver’s power derives directly from the
statute; but on the other, the statute never speciﬁcally carves out good
faith claims. While one could clearly make sound arguments in either
direction, a deﬁnitive answer must await clariﬁcation by the Delaware
courts—or legislature—as to whether section 122(17) also unwittingly
contractualized part of the duty of good faith.
4. Non-Delaware COWs. — Delaware was the clear pioneer in
authorizing COWs through statute. However, not long after the Delaware
reforms took root, other states began to follow suit. Table 1 offers an
overview of the states that have followed Delaware to date in amending
their statutory frameworks explicitly to allow COWs. Note from the Table
that the other states promulgating waiver statutes represent more of a
trickle than they do a ﬂood. Promulgating states moved in relatively
evenly spaced intervals, with no two states adopting waiver statutes in the
same calendar year. It is also worth noting that outside of Delaware, only
a few adopting states (Maryland and Nevada) are considered
“bellwether” states for incorporation.152 Notably absent from the list are
New York and California—two of the largest jurisdictional homes to
incorporated entities outside Delaware.153

150. Id. at 370 (“[T]he requirement to act in good faith ‘is a subsidiary element[,]’
i.e., a condition, ‘of the fundamental duty of loyalty.’” (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823
A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003))).
151. Disney, 906 A.2d at 66–67. Another focus of the good faith duty is deliberate
inaction by a corporate ﬁduciary in the face of a known duty to act. Id.
152. See Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation
Choice: Evidence on the “Race” Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1795, 1856 (2002) (discussing Maryland and Nevada’s leading roles in the market for outof-state incorporation).
153. See id. at 1815 ﬁg.2 (showing New York and California are two of the largest
states for incorporations).
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TABLE 1: STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR CORPORATE OPPORTUNITY WAIVERS
BY STATE154
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The structures of the follow-on statutes are similar—but not always
identical—to Delaware’s. Oklahoma, Kansas, New Jersey, and Maryland
each have provisions that closely track section 122(17) in all respects.155
However, there are also variations providing more or less latitude. For
example, Maryland and Washington omit the express modiﬁer “speciﬁed” in describing the scope of waivable classes or categories of business
opportunities.156 In addition, Missouri and Washington extend the scope
of permissible waivers to cover others beyond officers, directors, and
dominant shareholders.157 In Missouri, in fact, a COW may also cover any
agent or employee,158 and Washington allows COWs to cover “any other
person” beyond the usual suspects.159 At the same time, Washington’s
statute is also more restrictive in at least two ways. First, the waiver must
be part of a charter provision and cannot be adopted by action of the
board.160 Second, insofar as a COW reaches officers and dominant
shareholders, the statute requires speciﬁc board approval (effectively a
“reaffirmation”) of the waiver when a business opportunity arises that the
officer or dominant shareholder wishes to pursue.161
Given the paucity of developed case law even in Delaware, the
leadership position that Delaware generally has in establishing
precedents, and the fact that the other promulgating states moved later
to introduce their amendments, it would be reasonable to expect the
case law to be even less developed outside Delaware. Our investigation
reaffirms this conjecture: Beyond Corti, we were unable to ﬁnd any
reported cases interpreting the statutory provisions described in Table 1.
The lack of attention COWs have received in judicial opinions and
commentary might lead one to believe that the authorizing statutes have
155. Compare Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 122(17) (2017), with Kan. Stat. Ann. § 176102(17) (2014), Md. Code Ann., Corps. & Ass’ns § 2-103(15) (LexisNexis 2014), N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 14A:3-1(q) (West 2016), and Okla. Stat. tit. 18, § 1016(17) (2001).
156. See Md. Code Ann., Corps. & Ass’ns § 2-103(15); Wash. Rev. Code § 23B.02.020
(5)(k) (2015).
157. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 351.385(16) (2016); Wash. Rev. Code § 23B.02.020(5)(k).
158. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 351.385(16).
159. See Wash. Rev. Code § 23B.02.020(5)(k). One must not make too much of these
seemingly more expansive provisions, particularly in light of the fact that nonmanagerial
employees, independent contractors, and other nonﬁduciaries generally owe weaker (if
any) ﬁduciary duties to the corporation as principal. See Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc.,
782 F. Supp. 2d 911, 991 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (ﬁnding none of several employment agreements imposed ﬁduciary obligations because “[a]n employer’s trust and conﬁdence in its
employee must precede the acceptance of a ﬁduciary obligation”). Moreover, such
employees may be protected by other statutory mandates that help ensure their rights to
compete with the principal. See, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600 (West 2008)
(prohibiting noncompete restrictions as a matter of public policy for California employees,
regardless of state of incorporation). While a version of the corporate opportunities doctrine
certainly applies to such actors, for them it is a far more forgiving legal proscription.
160. See Wash. Rev. Code § 23B.02.020(5)(k) (listing COWs among provisions that
“[t]he articles of incorporation may contain”).
161. See id.
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simply not created much interest among eligible ﬁrms and that corporations have by and large declined the invitation to waive or truncate the
application of the COD as to their ﬁduciaries. As Part III will show,
however, this is hardly the case. In fact, corporations have demonstrated
an enormous appetite for contracting out of the COD. Before Part III
explores these ﬁndings, Part II lays down an analytical framework to
explain why this appetite may exist.
II. THEORY: EFFICIENT CONTRACTING OVER CORPORATE OPPORTUNITIES
The acknowledged unpredictability of the corporate opportunities
doctrine has long generated interest among commentators in developing
a coherent account of the doctrine that could serve as a normative
lodestar for courts.162 Among these accounts are contractarian approaches
that seek to fashion a COD based on precepts of efficient contract design
between a corporation and its ﬁduciaries—that is, how would they
plausibly bargain over their prospective rights to corporate opportunities
ex ante, given their capital constraints, information constraints, and
relative bargaining power?163 While not unique among conceptual
approaches, the contractarian account can be of considerable value to
efficiency-minded courts attempting to adjudicate the thorny equities
around disputed claims of ownership of new business prospects.
A signiﬁcant limitation of the contractarian project as applied to the
COD, however, was that the law traditionally prohibited parties from
using contracts to alter the relevant ﬁduciary obligations.164 Thus, if the
contractarian account was to have any sway, it would be through the
immutable precepts of the doctrine as announced and understood by
courts. Since Delaware’s 2000 reforms, of course, jurisdictions have
begun to permit parties to contractualize corporate opportunities.165 With
this change, contractarianism acquired far greater significance, both as a
normative guidepost for doctrine and as a vehicle for predicting—as a
positive matter—the incidence of COWs as well as their qualitative
characteristics. Section II.A brieﬂy outlines a contractarian account,
adopting and extending a theoretical framework originally developed in

162. Harvey Gelb, The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine—Recent Cases and the
Elusive Goal of Clarity, 31 U. Rich. L. Rev. 371, 372 (1997) (characterizing courts’
“yearning . . . for clarity in the corporate opportunity area” as “evident and understandable”); see also Victor Brudney & Robert Charles Clark, A New Look at Corporate
Opportunities, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 998, 998 (1981) (attempting to provide “relatively clear
rules” to guide courts in their application of the COD).
163. See, e.g., Talley, supra note 72, at 310–36.
164. See supra section I.B.1 (describing early difficulties associated with COWs); see
also supra note 8 and accompanying text (noting commentators have described the duty
of loyalty as “immutable”).
165. See supra sections I.B.2–.4 (discussing several states’ legislative reforms that
enable corporations to opt out of the COD).
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prior work.166 Section II.B suggests why it may frequently be efficient for
corporations to allocate corporate opportunities ex ante, rather than
merely at the time of board presentation—ex post—which historically
was the sole tool available.
Before proceeding, however, it is worth reiterating a lawyerly disclaimer
from the introduction: Conceptual arguments for how COWs could be
efficient should not be understood to evince a conviction that they are
efficient. That conclusion simply does not follow. Indeed, the agency cost
paradigm remains a powerful frame for corporate law,167 and it is entirely
possible that the main reason for the adoption of COWs is managerial
opportunism. Indeed, some empirical work on LLCs suggests that
entities that contract around ﬁduciary defaults often do so at their own
peril and with wealth-destructive consequences.168 Instead, this Part’s aim
is far more modest: It aspires to show that there exist plausible cases in
which waivers can augment shareholder value. Ultimately, the normative
desirability of COWs cannot be settled on theoretical grounds and
requires empirical investigation (to which Part III turns).
A.

Framework

To begin, assume a simple framework involving only two parties: (1)
a single principal (P, or the “ﬁrm”) and (2) a single agent (A), who
ostensibly works on P’s behalf.169 In the corporate opportunities context,
P will generally refer to the focal corporate entity, while A might
represent an officer, director, or dominant shareholder of P. One of A’s
key economic functions (and a source of value creation) comes from
evaluating new business “projects” that are presented to the ﬁrm and
taking on those projects that are sufficiently well suited to the ﬁrm’s
capabilities (generating a net proﬁt in the process).

166. For a more fulsome exposition, see generally Talley, supra note 72. Recall that
Delaware amended its statute in 2000. See supra notes 120–126 and accompanying text.
167. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency
Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Reevaluation of Governance Rights, 113 Colum. L.
Rev. 863, 869–71 (2013) (describing the role of agency costs in corporate governance).
The canonical work on agency costs is Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory
of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ.
305 (1976).
168. See, e.g., Mohsen Manesh, Contractual Freedom Under Delaware Alternative
Entity Law: Evidence from Publicly Traded LPs and LLCs, 37 J. Corp. L. 555, 574–78, 583–
89 (2012) (providing evidence of widespread waiver and exculpation of ﬁduciary duties in
LPs and LLCs and analyzing the impact of these waivers and exculpations); Peter Molk,
How Do LLC Owners Contract Around Default Statutory Protections?, 42 J. Corp. L.
(forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 52–54), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2754637 (on ﬁle
with the Columbia Law Review) (ﬁnding “very little evidence that supports of the efficiency
bargaining envisioned by LLC contractarian enthusiasts” and characterizing the results as
“worrisome” for “vulnerable LLC owners”).
169. Section II.B discusses other scenarios.
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Assume (for simplicity) that each new project yields revenues of
$100 (in expectation). Different projects, however, require different
mixes of skills and specialties. Accordingly, the net revenues that P can
capture from each project vary heterogeneously across projects. Some
projects, for example, may be directly in the ﬁrm’s “sweet spot” and
maximally proﬁtable, while others are so far aﬁeld from the ﬁrm’s area of
specialty that they are wholly unproﬁtable. We use the Greek letter theta
(θ ) to represent the speciﬁc “type” of skill or specialty requirements
entailed in a project presented to the ﬁrm. To ﬁx ideas, suppose
(arbitrarily) that the value of θ describes the percentage composition of
verbal (relative to technical) skills that the project requires. When θ =
0%, the project is entirely technical in nature, while when θ = 100%, it is
entirely verbal. Projects with intermediate values of θ entail a
proportional mixture of technical and verbal requirements. Suppose that
moreover ex ante, the next project’s requirements are probabilistically
distributed evenly (or “uniformly”) between 0% and 100%.
Project heterogeneity is crucial to how corporate opportunities
should be allocated, because the project’s net proﬁtability turns on how
closely aligned it is with P’s (or A’s) skill sets. Suppose (for concreteness)170 that P specializes in completing projects that are 50% verbal in
nature (i.e., projects of type θ = 50%) and can complete those projects at
a relatively low cost, assumed (arbitrarily) to be $20, for expected net
revenues of $80. Should the offered project differ from P’s area of
expertise, P could still conceivably accept it, but only by bearing an
adaptation cost away from its sweet spot to do so. Namely, it costs P an
additional $4 for each percentage increment it moves away from its
specialty. For instance, to take on a project with a 40% concentration of
verbal tasks (θ = 40%), P would need to bear a cost of $60 (i.e., $20 in
ﬁxed costs plus an additional $40 representing the cost of moving 10
percentage points from its specialty at $4 per point). In mathematical
terms, P’s cost of taking on a given type of project can be summarized by
the cost function CP(θ) = 20 + 4 · |θ − 50|. Figure 1 contains a diagram
representing the ﬁrm’s cost and proﬁt structure given these parameters.
This cost structure (pictured in green) is intended to capture the
intuition behind a ﬁrm’s “line of business”: P operates most proﬁtably
when the project coincides with its sweet spot of expertise (i.e., where θ =
50%), but P can adapt its production techniques to take on projects that
are further aﬁeld. This adaptation, however, comes at a cost, and this cost
increases with the “distance” between the ﬁrm’s specialty and the
requirements of the project. Given the numerical ﬁgures posited above,
the ﬁrm would never take on any negative-value project where θ < 30% or
θ > 70%. In an economic sense, then, the ﬁrm’s effective “line of
170. Although we hypothesize speciﬁc numbers and linear functional forms for
purposes of discussion, the framework easily generalizes to other formats. See Talley, supra
note 72, at 310–35, 344–49 (applying and extending a similar framework).
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business” is that set of projects the ﬁrm would have an economic
incentive to pursue. In Figure 1, this would correspond to any project
whose requirements fell on the region deﬁned by 30% ≤ θ ≤ 70% (a
region shaded in green).
FIGURE 1: REPRESENTATION OF PRINCIPAL’S COST STRUCTURE AND LINE OF
BUSINESS
$
CP(θ)

$100

Revenues = $100

$60

$20

30%

40%

50%

70%

θ

For present purposes, A’s key role at the ﬁrm is to attract and receive
information about new potential business projects that arrive and that
may be of interest to the ﬁrm. If merely identifying new prospects was all
A could do, then there would be no need for the corporate opportunities
doctrine. The problem—in both real life and our model—is that A’s
ability to spot and attract new business prospects will often coincide with
a private ability to take on projects herself, outside of the productive
infrastructure of P. Such a capacity for A is easy to imagine, such as when
A is a controlling corporate shareholder of P or the principal of a
ﬁnancial ﬁrm that also invests in competitors.
Thus, A may have her own interest in pursuing the project on the
outside (either individually or through a ﬁrm in which she has an
interest). In particular, suppose A faces a ﬁxed cost of x to take on any
new project (a cost ﬁgure that need not correspond with P’s ﬁxed cost of
$20). Suppose further that A’s sweet spot within her area of specialty is
denoted by z (which also need not correspond to the ﬁrm’s sweet spot of
50%). Finally, suppose that A’s marginal cost of adaptation is b dollars for
each percentage point difference between the project and A’s own
specialty (where the value of b similarly need not correspond to the ﬁrm’s
marginal cost of adaptation of $4 per percentage point). All told, then,
A’s cost of taking on a project of type θ can be summarized by the cost
function CA(θ) = x + b · |θ − z|.
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Standard economic intuition suggests that, so long as the characteristics of the offered project (reﬂected in θ) are observable by both
sides or readily veriﬁable by a third-party adjudicator, then an optimal
contract should allocate control over the project to the lowest cost
producer as between P and A.171 Indeed, this division uniquely maximizes
the total joint surplus that is available to the principal and agent
collectively. Under such a division of authority, the parties can use an
assortment of side payments (such as wages, licensing fees, or transfer
pricing) to divide the contingent revenues from the undertaken project
in any fashion they wish.172
Moreover, and central to present purposes, it is possible to use a
COW—if properly crafted—to achieve the optimal allocation of authority
over prospective projects. Within this Article’s framework, the particular
form of the optimal COW depends on the relative conﬁgurations of P’s
and A’s adaptation costs. Figure 2 illustrates four archetypal conﬁgurations, each of which gives rise to a different type of optimal waiver;
the scope of the optimal COW is illustrated with the green bands
overlaying P’s line of business (also in green). Each conﬁguration
assumes P has the same specialization and adaptation costs as stated
above, while A’s cost structure varies (with each conﬁguration containing
different values of x, z, and b). Figure 2a assumes that A’s specialty is at x
= 40%, that she faces a ﬁxed cost of z = $80 to take on the project, and
that her marginal cost of adaption is the same as P’s, at b = $4. Because of
A’s high ﬁxed costs, in this conﬁguration it turns out that there is no
project that A would ever be more efficient at taking on than P, and thus
it would never be optimal for P to waive any opportunities falling within
its line of business. Figure 2b maintains A’s specialty at x = 40% but
assumes a far lower ﬁxed cost (of z = $20) and a higher marginal cost of
adaptation (of $15 per 1% adaptation). Here, the optimal COW will tend
to permit A to appropriate a speciﬁc class of projects clustered near her
specialty, but it will reserve for P rights as to all other projects. Such a
provision would waive “only as to” a speciﬁed class or margin of projects
closely matching A’s sweet spot.173 Figure 2c continues to maintain A’s
specialty at x = 40% but assumes a ﬁxed cost of $70 and a marginal
adaptation cost of $0.60. For this conﬁguration, A’s ﬁxed cost is
171. See, e.g., Talley, supra note 72, at 322–26.
172. Prior work has already demonstrated this proposition formally. See Talley, supra
note 72, at 357–58 (presenting “Proposition 1”). Talley also analyzes the optimal
contracting problem when the characteristics of the project (θ ) are observable only to the
agent. See id. at 326–36. In such a circumstance, the optimal contract effectively gives the
agent a “call option” to appropriate the corporate opportunity individually in return for
paying an exercise price whose value is set by the various cost conﬁgurations of the
principal and the agent. See id. Because we see little evidence of such contractual
structures in our data, we suppress that analysis here and concentrate on the complete
information case, which appears to have ready instantiations in observed data.
173. In the ﬁgure, this class corresponds to projects falling on the interval 36.3% ≤ θ ≤
42.1%.
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sufficiently high that P remains the most efficient producer only near its
own sweet spot; however, A’s low adaptation cost gives A a comparative
advantage for projects that are near the periphery of P’s line of business.
This conﬁguration would be consistent with a waiving “all but” a
speciﬁed margin of projects near P’s specialty.174 Finally, Figure 2d
assumes an agent specialty very close to P’s (of x = 48%), a lower ﬁxed
cost (of z = $10), and the same marginal adaptation cost. For this
conﬁguration, A is always the lowest cost producer, and an optimal COW
would effectively give her free rein to pursue any and all projects.
FIGURE 2: OPTIMAL COWS (GREEN BANDS) FOR VARIOUS PRINCIPAL–AGENT
COST CONFIGURATIONS
Figure 2a: Optimal to Retain Status Quo (No COW)
$
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174. In the ﬁgure, the waiver would allow the agent to pursue projects falling on the
disjoint intervals θ ≤ 37.1% and θ ≥ 66.5%.
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Figure 2b: Optimal COW Waives “Only as to” Speciﬁed Classes of Projects
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Figure 2c: Optimal COW Waives “All but” Speciﬁed Classes of Projects
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Figure 2d: Optimal COW Waives “All” COs “to the Fullest Extent Allowed” by
Law
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The foregoing qualitative analysis delivers several insights about the
situations in which one would be likely to see different waiver
conﬁgurations. First are those instances—presumably very common—in
which an agent would never be more efficient at pursuing a project than
her corporate principal, as depicted in Figure 2a. Absent signiﬁcant
agency costs, such corporations will compose a universe that falls almost
entirely outside our data set, simply because they will generally (and
efficiently) eschew waivers. Our coding system would thus not detect
corporations that mention the renunciation of business opportunities in
order to specifically declare that they are not doing so. At any rate, because
nonwaiver of corporate opportunities is the legal default, we expect to
observe few such disclosures.175
Second, in situations in which the agent has a lower ﬁxed cost than
her principal, the optimal allocation of new opportunities will enable the
agent to pursue speciﬁc types of opportunities closely related to the
agent’s specialty, as depicted in Figure 2b. For example, imagine a
director who also manages a specialty enterprise on the side. For speciﬁc
projects related closely to that side enterprise, the director may be the
lowest cost producer of a new project, and an efficiency-enhancing waiver
would permit the director to pursue such projects.
Third, there are those conﬁgurations in which we might expect the
ﬁduciary agent to more easily adapt to pursue projects outside of her
175. On the other hand, if the agency problem is sufficiently severe that the agent
can induce the ﬁrm to cede new prospects to her (inefficiently), that cost should be
observable in reductions to company value. We test this proposition empirically in Part III.
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speciﬁc specialty than the principal, as depicted in Figure 2c. If the agent
is more versatile than the principal, the most efficient allocation of
corporate opportunities will retain a core set for the principal centered
around its specialization but will allocate the remaining opportunities to
the agent—an “all but” scope for the waiver.
Two general business scenarios are plausible candidates for including agents more versatile than their principals. The ﬁrst are ﬁnancial
ﬁduciaries. Venture capitalists, private equity ﬁrms, and hedge funds are
all capital investors that are well known for making major minority or
controlling investments in companies as well as for placing their own
principals and employees onto the boards of the companies in which
they invest.176 Both the directors these ﬁrms place on a company’s board
as well as the ﬁrms themselves (if their ownership interest is signiﬁcant
enough) can become the sponsored ﬁrm’s ﬁduciaries.177 As a result, these
ﬁduciaries would be obliged under the COD’s typical strictures to
present any potentially relevant new business prospects to the sponsored
entity. Yet, because of the range of other companies in which these
ﬁnancial ﬁrms often invest—and in which they might be interested in
investing—the ﬁnancial ﬁduciary (or her employer) will often be more
versatile than the principal. Second, partial corporate spin-offs may
create situations in which parent companies remain major shareholders
in a subsidiary—and thus owe it ﬁduciary duties—but in which the
parent company remains the lower-cost adapter to newly arising business
opportunities.178

176. See Christopher K. Aidun & Ernest Ceberio, Current Trends in Venture Capital
Fundraising: 2002, Cyberspace Law. (Glasser Legalworks, Little Falls, N.J.), Apr. 2002, at 5–
6 (describing the issues facing directors who are also venture-capital investors); Chris E.
Abbinante & Jessica B. Fairchild, Obtaining Advance Waivers in PE Transactions, Law360
(Mar. 18, 2010, 11:21 AM), http://law360.com/articles/155860/obtaining-advance-waiversin-pe-transactions [http://perma.cc/LN8S-9UU5] (discussing the issues facing privateequity investors who sit on multiple boards); Austin & Gottlieb, supra note 13 (“In the
private equity or ﬁnancial investor context, funds that make multiple investments in the
same or similar industries may want to avoid any undue restrictions imposed by the duty of
loyalty . . . .”); Stephan H. Coonrod & Annamarie C. Larson, Washington’s New Provisions
on Advance Waivers of Corporate Opportunities: Opening the Road for Investors, K&L
Gates (Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.klgates.com/washingtons-new-provisions-on-advance-waiversof-corporate-opportunities-opening-the-road-for-investors-04-28-2015 [http://perma.cc/784XFEW9] (“Venture capital and private equity ﬁrms commonly ﬁnance multiple investments
in the same area of activity and require a seat on the board of directors as a condition to
their investment.”).
177. See Aidun & Ceberio, supra note 176, at 5 (“A director of an emerging company
who is also a director, officer[,] or employee of a venture investor . . . may be faced with
conﬂicting interests and loyalties in carrying out his or her ﬁduciary duties to each
corporation and its stockholders.”); see also Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d
1110, 1113–14 (Del. 1994) (describing the circumstances under which a controlling
shareholder owes ﬁduciary duties).
178. Austin & Gottlieb, supra note 13 (“In the case of a spin-off or carve-out, the
parent company . . . may want to preserve its ﬂexibility to pursue potential business
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Finally, and most strangely, is a conﬁguration in which all new
business opportunities are waived, as depicted in Figure 2d. This scenario
is slightly bizarre because if the agent is the lowest cost pursuer of all new
business prospects, it raises the question of why the principal is even in
business. If the agent is the more efficient party to pursue all future
business, then perhaps the agent should simply buy out the principal’s
business. One context in which it might still make sense for a principal to
exist as a going concern but waive all business prospects is when the
principal is close to capacity on current projects but lacks the ability to
scale up. The current COD already treats such limitations of the
principal as sufficient to defeat a cause of action, but a broad waiver
could serve to clarify and ensure these limitations as dispositive for a
factﬁnder.
B.

Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Waivers

The traditional corporate opportunities doctrine has always permitted a corporation’s board to “reject” a business opportunity presented
to it by a corporate ﬁduciary, leaving the ﬁduciary free to pursue it
herself.179 So a reader may reasonably ask how precisely the ex ante
waivers authorized by section 122(17) and its ilk differ from what could
be called the ex post waivers already countenanced at common law. After
all, the ex post allocation of corporate opportunities to ﬁduciaries was
permissible before section 122(17) and remains so afterward.180 The key
feature of the traditional doctrine was that all corporate opportunities
were initially allocated to the corporation.181 That allocation was
mandatory in advance, but it became a waivable default when a ﬁduciary
actually presented a given opportunity to the board.182
Advance waivers will have an important efficiency role to play
precisely when it is less costly to allocate ex ante what could in principle
be bargained over ex post. One might think that the common law’s
preclusion of ex ante waivers was sensible, simply because parties will
always prefer paying ﬁduciaries with money and retaining opportunities
(renegotiating as needed later on). Corporate entities might seem
uniformly to be the more diversiﬁed party and better suited to bear the
risks of new business prospects. The modern corporate context enormously complicates this picture, however. If the corporate ﬁduciary is a
larger, controlling shareholder or a director who belongs to (and whose
duties implicate) a private equity ﬁrm, then the ﬁduciary may well be
more highly diversiﬁed than the company adopting a COW (especially if
opportunities that might also be of interest to the subsidiary without running afoul of its
ﬁduciary duties.”).
179. See supra text accompanying note 76.
180. See supra text accompanying note 76.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 75–76.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 75–76.
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that company faces a high cost of insolvency). If opportunities are more
efficiently allocated to ﬁduciaries, and both parties know this, then any
additional transaction cost ex post may justify an appropriate ex ante
allocation, formerly forbidden by law. None of this is to say that a default
allocation of all business opportunities to a corporation’s ﬁduciaries is
the efficient one—only that freeing corporations to replace the default
allocation may sometimes produce beneﬁcial results.
Indeed, as the remainder of this section shows, waivers under section
122(17) differ importantly in several respects, which together can make
ex ante waivers both less costly to adopt and which could result in
different—and more efficient—allocations of corporate opportunities
than the allocation resulting from ex post waivers.
1. Transaction Costs. — To a large extent, the distinction between ex
ante and ex post waivers hinges on evaluating the frictions of transaction
costs. In an idealized Coasean world in which transaction costs are
zero,183 the timing of a waiver may not matter much: Whenever it is
efficient for a corporation to renounce an opportunity in its ﬁduciary’s
favor, it will do so, whether ex ante or ex post. In such a setting, as with
many other Coasean environments, the legal rule becomes irrelevant.184
Indeed, even if transaction costs were positive but always the same across
time and context, then the choice of legal default would not have great
signiﬁcance. In the actual circumstances of corporate life, however, there
are several reasons to expect the presence of transaction costs to
sometimes make bargaining between the board and corporate ﬁduciaries
more problematic when done on an ad hoc basis than through an ex
ante waiver.
Most obviously, ex ante waivers allow a corporation to commit credibly
to ceding certain corporate opportunities (along with other contractual
quid pro quos) at the moment of contracting.185 For instance, if the
ﬁduciary is a controlling shareholder, it may be providing ﬁnancing to a
corporation years before it expects the corporation to encounter the
valuable new business prospects it desires the corporation to renounce.
This would be difficult to do exclusively with ex post waivers as the board
could simply refuse down the road to permit a ﬁduciary to pursue a
promised opportunity, rendering its prior promise valueless. This could
matter signiﬁcantly if what a given ﬁduciary—say, a controlling shareholder—sought from an investment was in important part new business
opportunities it would generate. Further, without an ex ante waiver, the
controlling shareholder would have a strong incentive to retain a 100%
183. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1, 2–15
(1960).
184. Id. at 8 (“[T]he ultimate result (which maximises the value of production) is
independent of the legal position if the pricing system is assumed to work without cost.”).
185. There is a vast literature on credible commitments and their important role in
commerce. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Corporate Control and Credible
Commitment, 43 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 119 (2015).
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controlling position in order to ensure opportunities were allocated to it.
With an advance waiver, however, a ﬁduciary can freely diversify when it is
efficient for it to do so.
Advance waivers can thus signiﬁcantly enhance the bargaining
space—in the form of new business prospects—that a corporation has
available to transfer in exchange for cheaper ﬁnancing (or the service of
an outstanding officer, the expert input of a venture capitalist, or the
rolodex of an outside director).186 This is a central function of contract:
to ensure that parties can credibly commit to follow through on their
commercial undertakings, enabling transactions whose performances are
separated in time.187 Without the possibility of ex ante commitments,
ﬁnancing that a ﬁduciary would have provided in exchange for promised
opportunities may not be exchanged, resulting in foregone gains from
trade.
Another limitation on ex post waivers is that the context of ﬁduciaries’ involvement in a corporation is a classic site for the ﬁduciary’s
development of highly specialized skills and abilities. A director or officer
typically invests years of work in a company and will usually acquire
knowledge and abilities that are valuable at the company but are of less
or no use elsewhere. A well-known hold-up problem can thus emerge.
For example, the corporation may know that a ﬁduciary’s service to it is
worth, say, $50,000, but only $30,000 to any other company. One can
further assume—plausibly, in the context of at least some early-stage
companies188—that corporate opportunities are one of the most valuable
forms of compensation a corporation has to offer. The framework
developed in section II.A likewise focused on situations in which the
ﬁduciary could, in terms of comparative advantage, simply be the more
efficient party to pursue a new business opportunity. In the absence of
enforceable advance waivers, the corporation may promise to provide the
ﬁduciary with a variety of opportunities as compensation but then fail to
renounce them as anticipated.189 If the ﬁduciary expects this, then she
will have signiﬁcantly dampened incentives to perform the specialized
tasks and invest in ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge vis-á-vis what is optimal. As a
186. It is worth noting that while a statutory reform like section 122(17) may allow for
cheaper ﬁnancing, or easier recruitment of managerial talent, it is also likely to affect how
surplus is allocated between corporations adopting waivers and their counterparties,
whether that counterparty be a private equity or venture capital ﬁrm or a potential new
director.
187. See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to
Support Exchange, 73 Am. Econ. Rev. 519 (1983).
188. Cf. Simone M. Sepe, Intruders in the Boardroom: The Case of Constituency
Directors, 91 Wash. U. L. Rev. 309, 328–29 (2013) (analyzing the contractual and
ﬁnancing consequences of various limitations faced by start-ups).
189. See, e.g., Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the
Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & Econ. 297, 302–03 (1978) (discussing
contractual enforcement as a potentially efficient response to parties opportunistically
reneging on promises).
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result, both the corporation and its ﬁduciaries stand to beneﬁt from an
enforceable contract for allocating corporate opportunities among them
in advance. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the hold-up problem can
obviously run both ways—ﬁduciaries may hold up the corporation, just as
the corporation may hold up its ﬁduciaries. There seems to be no a
priori reason to view one party to be more opportunistic than the
other,190 but the prospect of subsequent hold-up by the ﬁrm can be a
signiﬁcant driver for an ex ante waiver.
2. Board Dynamics. — Advance commitments can carry a host of
other beneﬁts as well. From a psychological vantage point, the members
of a board may ﬁnd it easier to commit to relinquish prospective business
opportunities upfront, in say a charter or contract provision, than in a
later ad hoc process when the opportunity is directly presented and the
loss of prospective proﬁts is palpable.
Depending on when the adoption of an ex ante waiver occurs, it can
also allow a board to avoid a conﬂicted vote, and potentially, to be
insulated from any possible breach of duty of loyalty allegation.191 For
instance, if a COW is adopted in a ﬁrm’s IPO charter, then a prospective
corporate ﬁduciary can bargain with the corporation at arm’s length and
the pre-IPO board can hold a vote on whether to include the COW
without any member needing to recuse herself.
3. Liquidity Constraints. — Another potential driver of advance waiver
activity is the inﬂuence of liquidity constraints, either at the ﬁrm or the
ﬁduciary level. In conventional economic frameworks, agents (the
ﬁduciaries) are wealth and capital constrained and thus unable to
“prepay” for the nonmonetary contractual rights that they value most
highly.192 When such rights consist of the allocation of corporate opportunities, the parties may be unable to reach an agreement allocating
those projects to the ﬁduciary even when the ﬁduciary is the most
efficient producer. In this case, of course, the default rule (reserving
rights for the corporation) may well be optimal, and thus there would be
little need for an ex ante waiver.193

190. There are some instances in which opportunism by the corporation is
signiﬁcantly more likely. Consider a joint venture (JV) entity formed by two major rival
corporations for a narrow and speciﬁc collaborative purpose. Typically, both of those rivals
will owe the JV ﬁduciary duties. See Sarath Sanga, The Contract Frontier: A Study of the
Modern Joint Venture 10–16 (Jan. 4, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://web.law.
columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/law-economics-studies/20150104_sarath_
sanga_modern_jv.pdf [http://perma.cc/GN7F-M6QM]. In this circumstance, there may
be far more scope for the entity to be weaponized by one corporation and used to hold up
its rival (via ﬁduciary duty claims) than for the rivals to hold up the JV.
191. See supra section I.A (describing the constraints imposed by the duty of loyalty);
supra section I.B.2 (explaining the legal effect of COWs).
192. See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 167, at 321 (assuming the manager has
limited “personal wealth” and thus can provide ﬁnancing only to a certain level).
193. This point is developed more fully in Talley, supra note 72, at 357–60.

2017]

CORPORATE OPPORTUNITY WAIVERS

1117

In other instances, however—particularly involving startups—the
corporation is the party that is cash poor and capital constrained,
hindering its endeavors to attract managers, directors, and potential
investors.194 Although the entrepreneur could offer to remunerate these
actors with equity, doing so has a dilutive effect on founders, common
shareholders, and employees—an effect that can erode internal
incentives to maximize value.195 One possible alternative in such
situations is to offer in-kind modes of compensation, including the allocation of property rights over future business opportunities. Symmetric
to the discussion above, in-kind compensation of this sort may efficiently
require the corporation to waive rights on certain projects in which it is
marginally the more efficient producer, thereby providing the ﬁduciary a
platform from which to proﬁt from the new opportunity itself (or
alternatively to resell it to the corporation at a less capital-constrained
juncture). In this case, executing a seemingly broad waiver may still
create value for shareholders if it is combined with attracting signiﬁcant
managerial talent.
4. Rules Versus Standards. — Ex ante waivers may also offer distinct
beneﬁts because they authorize private parties, through contract, to
replace the immensely complex and nebulous standard of the common
law with a rule crafted by the parties themselves (or at least a more
reﬁned standard).196 Even if the parties would ultimately end up with the
same allocation of corporate opportunities ex post as ex ante, the ability
to substantially clarify that allocation through advance contracting can
substantially reduce the scope for litigation costs stemming from either
opportunism or honest mistake.197 To be sure, few contractual provisions
deﬁne perfectly clear boundaries, and the COWs we observe do not even
attempt to do so. Nonetheless, COWs appear to generally replace a highly
indeﬁnite standard in one of ﬁduciary law’s most convoluted areas with
signiﬁcantly better-deﬁned directives.198 This may be able to deliver
substantial cost savings, which can be divided by the parties.

194. See Sepe, supra note 188, at 328–29.
195. See, e.g., Jason M. Gordon & David Orozco, Trust and Control: The Value Effect
of Venture Capital Term Sheet Provisions as Risk Allocation Tools, 4 Mich. Bus. &
Entrepreneurial L. Rev. 195, 196 (2015) (discussing the dilutive effects of new equity
issuances on founders and other equity holders).
196. See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
Duke L.J. 557 (1992) (offering a canonical economic exposition of the rule–standard
distinction).
197. Cf. id. at 570 (noting law enforcement is “costly, with the cost being greater if a
standard governs because the adjudication will also require giving content to the
standard”).
198. See, e.g., GoDaddy Inc., Amended and Restated Certiﬁcate of Incorporation
(Form 8-K, exh. 3.1), at 9–11 (Apr. 6, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/1609711/000119312515120133/d903539dex31.htm [http://perma.cc/RS9Z-DMZU];
HCA Holdings, Inc., Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation 10–11 (Mar.

1118

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 117:1075

In addition, the clarity of advance waivers can help establish clear
ground rules that serve as the backbone for a long-term commercial
relationship. Consider, for example, the 2007 COW disclosed by NetSuite
Inc., related to its signiﬁcant block shareholder and board member
Lawrence Ellison. Perhaps as a condition to his involvement with the
company, Ellison received a broad COW from NetSuite, which NetSuite’s
board of directors approved and disclosed in an SEC ﬁling.199 After
describing the common law standard, NetSuite replaced it with a brightline rule:
[A]s a majority stockholder, Mr. Ellison might, in certain
circumstances, have had a duty to present to the corporation
matters that come to him that are within our line of business or
would be deemed of interest to us. Under the waiver, we have
renounced any such duty, and Mr. Ellison will not need to present
any such opportunities to us . . . .200
Although this waiver is clearly quite broad, it may also have been
necessary to bring on Ellison as a signiﬁcant investor. More importantly,
this waiver plausibly helped pave the way for a long-term relationship
between Ellison, Oracle, and NetSuite, one that arguably facilitated
Oracle’s $9.3 billion acquisition of NetSuite.201
As noted earlier, the discussion above is meant to demonstrate only
that there exist several plausible economic contexts where COWs—even
broad ones—are value enhancing for both the beneﬁciary and the
waiving corporation. Such contexts, of course, must uneasily co-exist with
omnipresent agency cost problems, in which corporate ﬁduciaries may
use their inﬂuence at the company to line their own pockets at
shareholders’ expense. To the extent that the former efficiency-related
factors outweigh agency cost considerations, Delaware’s reform program
has been beneﬁcial for capital investors. To the extent the opposite
holds, however, the policy landscape ﬂips. Ultimately, this question is
8, 2011), http://investor.hcahealthcare.com/sites/hcahealthcare.investorhq.businesswire.
com/files/doc_library/file/CertificateofIncorporation.pdf [http://perma.cc/B4Zh-VLHY].
199. See NetSuite Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 24 (Mar. 13, 2009),
http://www.sec.gov/Archies/edgar/data/1117106/000119312509053860/d10k.htm
[http://perma.cc/9TXF-QQQF].
200. NetSuite Inc., Prospectus (Form 424B4), at 109 (Dec. 19, 2007),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1117106/000119312507268607/d424b4.htm
[http://perma.cc/4Bd5-RAA4] (emphasis added).
201. See Quentin Hardy & Leslie Picker, Oracle’s $9.3 Billion Deal for
NetSuite Will Bolster Its Cloud Offerings, N.Y. Times: Dealbook ( July 28, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/29/business/dealbook/oracle-netsuite-ellison-cloudcomputing.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (noting the “relationship [between
Ellison and NetSuite’s founder] came full circle as Oracle agreed to acquire NetSuite for
$9.3 billion” years after Ellison backed NetSuite’s inception); Press Release,
Oracle, Oracle Completes Tender Offer Acquisition of NetSuite (Nov. 5, 2016),
http://www.oracle.com/corporate/pressrelease/oracle-tender-offer-netsuite.html
[http://perma.cc/N6VB-KTYQ] (announcing the completion of this acquisition).
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indeterminate within the realm of economic theory alone, and an
empirical analysis is warranted. It is to that analysis that Part III turns.
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The historically unprecedented power that many corporations now
have to opt out of the COD seems to have been largely overlooked in
both case law and law and ﬁnance scholarship, generating little
systematic analysis of any form.202 This neglect is surprising, and it seems
undeserved for several reasons, ranging from the technical to the policy
related.
On the more technical side, the duty of loyalty is a long-hallowed
“sacred cow” of ﬁduciary principles, traditionally unyielding to private,
contractual end-runs.203 Any systematic shift that concerns when and how
corporate entities may embrace such waivers is, at the very least,
important to document, given its departure with longstanding legal
tradition. Moreover, a cottage industry of corporate governance metrics
for incorporated entities has taken root in the last decade.204 These
metrics seek to aggregate and assess when ﬁrms opt out of (or otherwise
contract around) various corporate law default rules, such as through
classiﬁed boards, poison pills, duty of care waivers, blank-check stock,
and the like. The results can be useful for both scholars and industry
groups, such as proxy ﬁrms that often address corporate governance
votes for institutional clients. Sophisticated producers and consumers of
such metrics should be interested in these new mechanisms that permit
parties to contract out of the duty of loyalty in order to provide a
complete picture of governance arrangements.
More substantively, COWs bear on central “big picture” debates in
corporate law. First, how corporations respond to this new power to tailor
can importantly inform scholarly debates regarding whether
corporations actually use their capacious legal freedoms to tailor default
terms.205 The question lurking in the background—and one of corporate
law’s most profound quandaries—is whether we can expect (or trust)
corporations, when freed to do so by law, to adopt optimal corporate
governance structures on their own accord.206
202. See, e.g., Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 185, at 120 (noting section 122(17) as a
rare exception to the mandatory character of the duty of loyalty).
203. See supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text.
204. See Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton & Roberta Romano, The Promise and Peril of
Corporate Governance Indices, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1803, 1809–14 (2008) (providing an
overview and assessment of some of these early trends).
205. See Henry Hansmann, Corporation and Contract, 8 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 1, 4
(2006) (“[T]he extraordinary freedom that is now available to the drafters of corporate
charters is exploited in remarkably small degree.”).
206. See Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance, 65
Stan. L. Rev. 1325, 1327–29 (2013) (characterizing the issue of “whether market imperfections impede the establishment of optimal governance arrangements” as “an empirical

1120

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 117:1075

Even more generally, the empirical experience of COWs goes
straight to the heart of a broader normative question: Are COWs socially
beneﬁcial? This question arises at the intersection of two distinct but
important strains in corporate theory, for the very transaction-cost
arguments that motivated the amendments permitting COWs207 are in
signiﬁcant tension with well-known arguments justifying loyalty as a core
check on managerial opportunism and agency costs.208 Understanding
how COWs have played out in the post-deregulatory environment may
shed light on other areas where scholars vigorously disagree as to
whether ﬁduciary duties should be mandatory.209
The scant literature on COWs may be—at least in part—an artifact
of the practical difficulty of data collection. Most conventional corporate
governance provisions are located in relatively discrete and easy-to-isolate
sources (such as the charter or shareholder-approved bylaws). As documented in section I.B.2, however, COWs are generally not required to be
executed according to any particular regimen, and thus they can be
scattered across myriad corporate documents, including charters, bylaws,
contracts, board resolutions, and the like. Consequently, searching for
waivers requires combing through many (if not all) disclosures made by
public companies to securities regulators.
This Part describes and reports on an empirical analysis of a large
sample of COWs disclosed in public corporate ﬁlings, which we extracted
and coded. Section III.B shows that COWs are common and widespread
among public companies within our sample. Moreover, we employ
machine-learning techniques to extrapolate our classiﬁcation procedure
outside of our sample, from which we can infer (with signiﬁcant
conﬁdence) that well over one thousand public companies to date have
made use of their newfound freedom to contractually allocate corporate
opportunities, and they continue to do so at an increasing rate.210
Waivers appear across industrial sectors, although they are overrepresented in some of them.211
In addition, this Part employs a variety of empirical methods to
examine the normative question of whether corporations have used the
freedom to adopt COWs to create or destroy value. First, section III.C
question” that cannot be settled solely on the basis of theory); see also Zohar Goshen &
Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law and Governance, 117
Colum. L. Rev. 767, 828 (2017) (recommending a presumption in favor of default rules
"unless there is a speciﬁc market failure”).
207. See supra section II.B.1.
208. See supra notes 2–7 and accompanying text.
209. Compare supra note 85 and accompanying text (noting views that support
mandatory rules), with Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous
Case for Mandatory Corporate Laws, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1599, 1603–15 (1989) (questioning
the utility of mandatory rules).
210. See infra Figure 3.
211. See infra notes 258–259 and accompanying text.
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reveals that the companies embracing COWs generally tend not to exhibit
indicia of questionable investment value or managerial practices. Rather,
using standard measures of ﬁrm value, COW adopters appear to have
markers of value creation and effective management.212 Second, section
III.D reports the results of an event study that measures the value created
by adopting a COW, using the stock market’s reaction to their public
disclosure as a proxy. Perhaps surprisingly, for those ﬁrms for which we
could measure returns on stock-price reaction to an announced COW,
the market appears to receive such news positively, generating four-day
cumulative abnormal returns of between 1% and 1.5%.213 In addition, as
a robustness check, we make use of the lagged implementation of
reforms across the nine reforming states. We similarly ﬁnd evidence of a
positive market response to passage of a COW reform among issuers
incorporated inside the reforming jurisdiction.214 These ﬁndings go
some way to allay fears that corporations adopting COWs are
systematically those with worse agency costs.
A.

Data

To investigate the empirical incidence (and effects) of COW adoption, we constructed an original data set based on disclosures by publicly
traded corporations. Typically, if a public company adopts a waiver of
corporate opportunities, the adoption is likely to be disclosed in some
form of document that the corporation will ﬁle with the SEC. We began
by utilizing a “mirror” of the SEC’s EDGAR database, which replicates
over twenty-one million issuer ﬁlings available from 1995 through March
2016.215 Because most states’ statutes authorizing COWs permit their
execution across a wide spectrum of contracts, resolutions, and corporate
governance documents,216 we did not constrain our examination of
EDGAR ﬁlings to any speciﬁc ﬁling “form” (such as 10-Ks, 8-Ks, or 14-As).
To this mirrored data set we applied a Boolean keyword search217—
212. See infra Table 6.
213. Infra Table 7.
214. See infra Figure 6.
215. See EDGAR: Company Filings, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/
companysearch.html [http://perma.cc/2X4D-WWAU] (last visited Jan. 31, 2017) (noting
“access to more than 21 million ﬁlings”). 1995 was the ﬁrst year for which the database
had reliably global coverage. See Electronic Filing and the EDGAR System: A Regulatory
Overview, SEC (Oct. 3, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/info/edgar/regoverview.htm
[http://perma.cc/T6AX-VLNN] (last modiﬁed Nov. 16, 2006) (noting “full implementation of mandated electronic ﬁling” began after mid-1994); Help - History of EDGAR,
EDGAR Online, http://help.edgar-online.com/edgar/history.asp [http://perma.cc/G2MQQQWV] (last visited Jan. 31, 2017).
216. See supra section I.B.4.
217. The exact search took the form: “[(corporate OR commercial OR business)
followed by (opportunit!)] within the same sentence as [(waiv! OR renounc! OR
disclaim)]”. The “!” marks here serve as root expanders to pick up any stems, alternative
endings, or punctuation marks around the relevant word.

1122

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 117:1075

similar to what one might use in a Westlaw or LexisNexis query—
designed to identify candidate instances of a disclosed COW based on a
ﬁling’s similarity with the search query.218 This process resulted in 10,682
distinct candidate disclosures.219 Our keyword search was designed to be
quite general, but this generality also assured that it was relatively
overinclusive.
From this large candidate data set, we randomly selected one
thousand excerpts for manual coding with the help of a small group of
trained research assistants. We designed a coding procedure that
employed forty-one distinct variables.220 Our rubric focused on the three
fundamental questions that pertain to any waiver:
1. How is a company adopting the waiver? The ﬁrst seven variables
inquire as to how a ﬁling company is adopting a COW, whether in its
charter, bylaws, board resolution, or some other kind of disclosure.
2. Who is covered by the waiver (e.g., a single officer or director, all
officers and directors, a controlling shareholder, and so forth)? The next
thirty variables inquire into who is covered by the COW. This sequence
includes both who is covered at the ﬁling entity (fourteen variables), and,
if another entity is mentioned, then who is covered within the management or ownership structure of that other entity (sixteen variables).
3. What is the extent to which a company is waiving the COD as to
those covered? The last four variables inquire into whether the scope of
the waiver covers all business opportunities, a speciﬁed list of such
opportunities, all opportunities except for some speciﬁed subclass, or a
wildcard term waiving corporate opportunities “to the fullest extent
allowed by law” (or a substantive semantic equivalent).
As noted above, the keyword search we used to identify candidate
COWs was deliberately overinclusive, ﬂagging a series of documents that
were sure to include some “false positives”—snippets that satisﬁed the
keyword criterion but were judged by coders not to reﬂect COWs.
After cleaning the hand-coded sample data, we deployed several
measures to enhance the richness and reliability of the data. First, we
linked our database to a variety of other publicly available data sets that

218. For every matching candidate document, we extracted the responsive sentence
(or sentences) as well as three preceding sentences and three succeeding sentences
around each detected excerpt (or “snippet”).
219. Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Corporate Opportunity Waivers Data Set (on
ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Data Set]. This data set will be available on
the Columbia Law Review website, www.columbialawreview.org, starting in September 2017.
220. Table A.2 in the Appendix contains the coding rubric. We engaged in a
signiﬁcant training and cross-validation program with the research assistants who coded
excerpts, designing signiﬁcant “overlap” in coded terms, so as to detect (and correct)
inter-coder inconsistencies.
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are widely used in law and ﬁnance scholarship (Compustat and CRSP221)
to gain insight about the ﬁnancial and governance characteristics of
issuers adopting COWs. Second, we used the hand-coded data to train a
machine-learning (ML) classiﬁer, adapting a technique previously
developed by one of us to classify the remainder of the snippets algorithmically.222 This process not only enabled us to look beyond our sample of
COW disclosures with signiﬁcant conﬁdence,223 but it also facilitated an
alternative means to audit the hand-coded data for errors or
inconsistencies.224
B.

Descriptive Statistics of Waivers

Within the randomly selected sample of 1,000 candidate SEC ﬁlings,
our manual coding enterprise yielded 628 responsive documents from
427 unique issuers that contained a bona ﬁde COW disclosure.225 Of
these, 237 were operative provisions in which a ﬁling company enacted a
COW, and 391 were disclosures discussing such an operative provision
elsewhere.226 (The remaining candidate documents were deemed
nonresponsive—reﬂecting a 38.5% “false positive” rate from our keyword
search.227) Extrapolating proportionally to the full population of 10,682
ﬁlings, one would predict upwards of 6,700 responsive disclosures across
the population of snippets. And indeed, the ML classiﬁer bears this
prediction out, detecting 6,859 COW disclosures from 1,592 unique
issuers (averaging around 326 disclosures per year over two decades).228
These ﬁgures alone embody a key ﬁnding of this study: Public companies
have shown a signiﬁcant appetite for contracting out of the ﬁduciary duty of
loyalty.
221. CRSP/Compustat Merged Database, CRSP, http://www.crsp.com/products/
research-products/crspcompustat-merged-database [http://perma.cc/Q7GT-NPCM] (last visited
Mar. 6, 2017).
222. See Eric Talley & Drew O’Kane, The Measure of a MAC: A Machine-Learning
Protocol for Analyzing Force Majeure Clauses in M&A Agreements, 168 J. Institutional &
Theoretical Econ. 181 (2012).
223. The ML classiﬁer proved extremely accurate, correctly categorizing COWs 93.5%
of the time within our hand-coded sample. The classiﬁer lost little of its mojo even when
extended outside the sample: In Monte Carlo simulations, it correctly categorized
simulated out-of-sample COWs at a mean rate of 92.5% (with standard deviation of
1.50%). For details, see Rauterberg & Talley, supra note 16.
224. We inspected all snippets for which the human-coded and machine-classiﬁed
data disagreed as to the presence of a COW (n = 65). In around 80% of these cases, we
concurred with the humans. We recoded the remaining 20% where we agreed with the
machine, and then we completely retrained the ML classiﬁer.
225. Data Set, supra note 219.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. While the ML classiﬁer tags between ten and eleven times as many COW
disclosures as the sample (as expected), it identiﬁes only between three and four times as
many unique issuers. Id. This is also unsurprising on reﬂection: As sample size grows, it
becomes increasingly likely that multiple disclosures by single issuers are picked up.
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That appetite, however, was slow to arrive. Figure 3 illustrates the
yearly counts of COW disclosures in both our hand-coded sample (left
axis; blue line) and in the ML-classiﬁed population (right axis; red line).
Note that the incidence of disclosed COWs was initially quite low—
though not zero—both before and immediately after Delaware’s
statutory amendment in 2000.229 The nonzero incidence of disclosed
COWs prior to 2000 is not altogether surprising, given that DGCL section
122(17) was itself a legislative rejoinder to a judicial response to a
disclosed waiver.230 The initial reticence of issuers to embrace the COW
from 2000 to 2003,231 in contrast, is somewhat more notable, and it
attracted the attention of commentators at the time.232 It is plausible that
this initial tepid response reﬂected the post-dot-com hangover that
suppressed U.S. ﬁnancial markets.233 Whatever the reason, by 2004, the
herd of COWs began to propagate with impunity, growing roughly
exponentially since (with a slight buckle during the ﬁnancial crisis).234 By
the turn of the decade, COW disclosures had become commonplace—
surpassing 1,000 per year by 2014.235 There is signiﬁcant heterogeneity in
the forms of disclosure, reﬂecting the open-ended waiver procedure
authorized by most states’ enabling statutes.236 Just under half of the
COW disclosures come from IPO-related ﬁlings, approximately 10%
appear in each of “current report” (8-K) ﬁlings and routine annual or
quarterly ﬁlings (10-K or 10-Q), and around 7% appear in proxy
materials.237 These ﬁgures are nearly identical in both the hand- and
machine-coded data.238

229. See infra Figure 3.
230. See supra section I.B.2 (cataloging various states’ enabling statutes).
231. See infra Figure 3.
232. See Austin & Gottlieb, supra note 13.
233. To Fly, to Fall, to Fly Again, Economist (July 25, 2015), http://www.economist.com/
news/brieﬁng/21659722-tech-boom-may-get-bumpy-it-will-not-end-repeat-dotcom-crash-ﬂy
[http://perma.cc/2LET-F52N] (discussing the negative effects of the bursting of the dotcom bubble on venture capital).
234. See infra Figure 3.
235. See infra Figure 3. The apparent decline in 2016 is due to the fact that counts
for the complete 2016 year are not available as of this writing.
236. See supra section I.B.4.
237. Data Set, supra note 219.
238. Id.
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FIGURE 3: TOTAL COW DISCLOSURES BY YEAR (HAND CODED VERSUS ML
CLASSIFIED)
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Another important issue surrounding COWs is where they can be
found within ﬁrms’ governance documents and other written instruments. Table 2 summarizes the location of manually coded waivers across
various document types.239

239. Tables 2 through 4 concentrate on our hand-coded sample, leaving for another
day the calibration of an ML classiﬁer for these nested subsidiary provisions. Note that
total counts of provisions tend to exceed the aggregate number of COW disclosures, since
the subcategories are not mutually exclusive. Percentages are based on the “Operative
Provision” categories.
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TABLE 2: LOCATION OF COW IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
DOCUMENTS
Location of
Waiver

Operative
Provision

Discussion of
Waiver

Percentage of
COWs

Charter

169

337

80.57%

Bylaws

5

10

2.39%

Board
Resolution

1

11

1.91%

Other

59

41

15.92%

As Table 2 shows, over three quarters of the COWs in the sample
appear to be located in a corporate charter, evincing a degree of
commitment to the waiver that is difficult to unwind absent a
shareholder vote. That said, nearly 20% of the remainder waivers appear
to be spread across a variety of contractual instruments, which are
usually—in contrast—susceptible to renegotiation and restructuring by
the board alone, without shareholder involvement.240
As previously noted, the wording of most states’ statutes provides
appreciable freedom for the drafters to waive broad or narrow categories
of corporate opportunities.241 Given that the default rule in corporate law
is no waiver,242 a broader express waiver signals a greater departure from
traditional ﬁduciary principles. Table 3 summarizes the scope of COWs
in the sample.
TABLE 3: SCOPE OF WAIVER
Scope of Waiver

Operative Discussion
% of COWs
Provision of Waiver

All Corporate Opportunities

111

115

35.99%

“All but” Certain Corporate
Opportunities

101

198

47.61%

Speciﬁed Corporate Opportunities

37

67

16.56%

Explicit Non-Waiver of Corporate
Opportunities

1

6

1.11%

240. Supra Table 2.
241. See supra sections I.B.2–.4.
242. See supra section I.A.2.
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The breadth of the language in the waivers is notable. About 36% of
COW disclosures include at least one waiver that purports to waive “all”
corporate opportunities.243 Just under 48% include at least one waiver
purporting to waive “all but” a reserved class or category of opportunities.244 In our estimation, these clearly represent notably broad waivers.
In contrast, only just under 17% of COW disclosures waive the doctrine
in a more modest fashion (following the actual wording of the statute),
limiting the disclaimer to a speciﬁed class or category of opportunities.245
Another important scope consideration is how the coded sample
allocates waivers across different types of corporate actors. Recall that this
group can include corporate directors, officers, and dominant shareholders,246 all of whom owe a loyalty obligation to the corporation.247
Table 4 summarizes the target of the coded provisions by the role of the
actor—officer, director, or shareholder. (The aggregate counts listed
signiﬁcantly exceed the total number of detected waivers, since waivers
routinely apply to multiple classes of actors and sometimes differentiate
between subclasses of actors.)
TABLE 4: CORPORATE FIDUCIARIES COVERED BY COW
Reach of Waiver

Operative
Provision

Discussion of
Waiver

Percentage of
COWs

Officer(s)248

115

194

49.20%

Director(s)249

172

278

71.66%

Shareholder(s)

114

115

36.46%

250

Table 4 shows that corporate directors are the most frequent
beneﬁciaries of COWs, covered by nearly three quarters of COWs in our
sample—an observation consistent with the aim of the reform to
ameliorate conﬂicts that come from overlapping directorships among
venture capital and private equity investors.251 Perhaps for similar
243. Supra Table 3.
244. Supra Table 3.
245. Supra Table 3.
246. See supra sections I.B.2.–.4.
247. See supra section I.A.
248. This category blends: all officers, any officers, or enumerated officers covered by the
COW.
249. This category blends: all directors, any directors, or enumerated directors covered by
the COW.
250. This category blends: all shareholders, any shareholders, or enumerated shareholders
covered by the COW.
251. See supra section I.B.2 (describing the impetus behind the 2000 Delaware
reforms).
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reasons, shareholders are commonly beneﬁciaries of a waiver as well,
covered just under 50% of the time.252 Notably, however, corporate
officers are also routinely included in COW disclosures, with a waiver
applying to them nearly half of the time,253 a factor that is somewhat
striking given the full-time nature of an officer’s duties to the ﬁrm.254
C.

Issuer Characteristics of COW Adopters

The exercise of harvesting, coding, and documenting COW disclosures is one of the key contributions of this Article. Nevertheless, it is
possible to say somewhat more by linking the disclosing issuers to several
other databases providing industry and financial data. A particularly
interesting industry source is the Compustat database, which contains
information related to corporate governance and ﬁnancial performance
as disclosed in issuers’ annual and quarterly ﬁnancial reports.255 We
therefore undertook to link the COW database to Compustat (for the
period 1994 through 2016). Although this matching process resulted (as
it often does) in some loss of data, we were able to match a signiﬁcant
fraction of COW disclosers with their financial information: We
ultimately matched approximately 377 issuers in the hand-coded data
sample and 1,765 issuers in the machine-classiﬁed population.256
Using these matched ﬁrms, it is possible to consider a host of ﬁrmlevel indicia. Preliminary analysis suggests the industry representation of
disclosed COWs appears to track that of Compustat ﬁrms, with a few
notable areas of industry overrepresentation.257 In particular, oil and gas
issuers represent 9.71% of COWs as compared with 3.95% of Compustat
ﬁrms.258 Similarly, Business Services issuers represent 13.12% of the pilot
sample but only 9.04% of the Compustat universe.259 The overrepresentation in both industries plausibly reﬂects the popularity in these
industries of ownership structures characterized by multiple investments
across portfolio companies. (Additional research and data collection will
be needed to test this hypothesis.)

252. Supra Table 4.
253. Supra Table 4.
254. See Clark, supra note 80, § 7.6, at 243 (recommending a categorical prohibition
for full-time executives of public companies).
255. CRSP, supra note 221.
256. Data Set, supra note 219. Since reliable ﬁnancial ﬁlings occur on an annual
basis, the merged data are best analyzed with an “issuer-year” unit of analysis, so that any
issuer making multiple COW announcements in a single year would be collapsed into a
single observation for that year. This process resulted in collapsing just over 90 of the
COW disclosures in the hand-coded sample and around 3,300 in the ML-classiﬁed
population. Id.
257. See id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
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Because corporate law (and the permissibility of COWs) is an artifact
of state law,260 adopters’ incorporation jurisdiction is of obvious interest.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the public ﬁrms embracing COWs are heavily
overrepresented by Delaware. Indeed, as Table 5 illustrates, in both the
hand-coded and machine-classiﬁed data sets, about nine out of ten
waiver disclosures come from Delaware corporations, far more than the
population-wide proportion of U.S. public companies incorporated in
Delaware (which is just north of 50%).
TABLE 5: COWS IN SAMPLE, BY STATE OF INCORPORATION
State

Hand-Coded
Matches

ML-Classiﬁed
Matches

Compustat
Universe

Delaware

89.82%

87.94%

51.20%

Maryland

5.18%

4.30%

6.69%

Nevada

0.11%

1.61%

4.80%

California

0.00%

0.54%

2.62%

New York

0.27%

0.48%

2.85%

Texas

0.54%

0.42%

1.74%

Other

4.08%

4.84%

30.10%

Observations

367

1,675

228,940

The signiﬁcant overrepresentation of Delaware may be due to a
variety of factors, including the fact that Delaware was the earliest
mover,261 the signiﬁcant network externalities among the Delaware bench
and bar,262 the (possibly) larger comparative size of Delaware-incorporated adopters, and the potential remaining invalidity of COWs in many
other states.
One beneﬁt of linking the data on disclosed COWs to other
ﬁnancial databases is that doing so sheds considerable light on both what
types of companies embrace waivers and what such adoptions portend
for company value. Our empirical analysis provides several interesting
insights about the relationship of COW adoption and ﬁnancial measures
related to proﬁtability and value creation. Table 6 illustrates some of
these relationships.
260. See 1 Fletcher, supra note 67, § 2.50 (noting that corporations “deriv[e] their
existence and authority to act from the state”); supra section I.A.2 (discussing ﬁduciary
duties, including the COD, under state law).
261. See supra section I.B.2.
262. See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts,
81 Va. L. Rev. 757, 843–47 (1995) (explaining Delaware’s general success as a product of
network externalities).

2,026.69

375

357

347

Revenues

Capital
Expenditures

EBITDA

ROA
(Winsorized
0.05)
Tobin Q
(Winsorized,
0.05)

1,477.30

376

2.63%

1.82

347

306

291.65

165.54

5,208.52

6,520.51

377

376

Total
Liabilities
Long-Term
Debt

Total Assets

Mean

1.84

26.99%

662.21

428.22

5,073.53

3,337.86

20,132.28

22,486.22

σ

1,278

1,644

1,644

1,678

1,748

1,762

1,763

1,765

N

1.85

1.73%

541.26

290.44

3,035.90

1,610.58

4,753.53

6,715.54

Mean

1.25

8.72%

89.91

27.97

518.91

295.36

608.53

1,049.00

Median
σ

1.79

26.87%

2,930.55

1,701.72

18,487.55

4,101.25

19,344.98

27,096.59

ML-Classiﬁed Matches

161,517

215,870

216,750

210,405

249,682

250,407

250,554

250,939

N

1.76

−4.33%

416.51

169.53

2,191.23

1,774.49

9,031.21

10,464.70

Mean

0.98

6.36%

10.66

3.84

97.11

13.97

135.70

265.84

Median

Compustat Universe

2.21

33.98%

2,475.01

1,064.25

11,100.68

29,637.05

87,974.92

93,293.74

σ
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1.21

8.65%

113.58

29.00

635.58

384.53

758.16

1,257.21

Median

Hand-Coded Matches

N

Table 6a: All Entities
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TABLE 6: COW DISCLOSERS VERSUS COMPUSTAT FINANCIAL PROFILES
(1994–2016)

1.86

268

302.90

308

EBITDA

3.48%

166.20

308

Capital
Expenditures

308

2,212.23

323

Revenues

ROA
(Winsorized
0.05)
Tobin Q
(Winsorized,
0.05)

1,544.92

324

6,677.96

5,333.33

325

1.25

9.21%

120.92

32.04

691.91

409.13

887.92

1,266.41

σ

1.84

25.05%

681.99

434.21

5,411.67

3,511.78

20,820.11

23,298.00

Hand-Coded Matches
Mean
Median

324

Total
Liabilities
Long-Term
Debt

Total Assets

N

1,126

1,372

1,372

1,379

1,426

1,438

1,439

1,441

N

1.90

1.93%

355.80

201.10

2,096.75

1,508.31

3,678.93

4,949.15

1.27

8.95%

97.37

30.17

598.32

299.57

627.10

1,000.18

σ

1.82

26.57%

1,017.42

549.53

4,840.23

3,764.31

13,442.86

16,339.89

ML-Classiﬁed Matches
Mean
Median

Table 6b: Delaware Corporations

66,170

90,719

92,877

90,116

101,272

101,404

101,500

101,734

N

1.93

−4.47%

335.36

135.10

2,053.73

1,274.98

6,405.07

7,644.90

1.14

7.26%

12.13

4.97

135.27

12.78

113.77

232.38

Compustat Universe
Mean
Median

2.17

34.28%

2,023.25

869.99

10,236.67

10,357.32

63,648.47

70,347.15

σ
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Several interesting ﬁndings emerge from these descriptive statistics.
As Table 6a illustrates, COW adopters tend to be smaller on average—not
larger—than the mean Compustat issuer on many balance sheet metrics,
such as total assets, total liabilities, and long-term debt. Yet the median
COW adopter, in contrast, tends to be somewhat larger than the
population median,263 suggesting that COWs are embraced by a narrower
cross-section of issuers that are relatively large but not at the highest (or
lowest) end of the distribution. In addition, disclosing ﬁrms appear to
exhibit substantially stronger median income-statement metrics, revenues, capital expenditures, and earnings, with roughly commensurate
means.264 One frequently used measuring stick of value creation within
ﬁnance is the annual return that the issuer makes on its overall assets
(ROA)265—a valuation metric that is largely independent of debt–equity
structures. Here, COW disclosers within the two samples tend to
outperform the comparator Compustat group (along both mean and
median dimensions) in generating returns for outside capital investors.
Table 6b reports the same set of valuation metrics but with both samples
limited to Delaware incorporated ﬁrms. Most of the patterns persist here
too (with some variations).266
***
The descriptive statistics summarized in this section paint a picture
that holds clear relevance to larger policy debates about both COWs
speciﬁcally and the contractibility of ﬁduciary duties more generally. In
particular, we see no evidence—based on these data—that COWs are
systematically embraced by under-achieving ﬁrms that use the waiver as a pretext
for inefficiently diverting value away from capital investors. To the contrary,
these data suggest that waivers are adopted by relatively healthy companies with robust cash-ﬂow potential and an established record of
delivering attractive returns to their capital investors. This proﬁle is
consistent with the shareholder-value-enhancing account of COWs developed in Part II, in which COWs can serve as important complements to
building value-enhancing corporate structures by clarifying the boundaries of what is sometimes considered an incurably opaque and recondite
area of corporate ﬁduciary law.

263. See supra Table 6.
264. See supra Table 6.
265. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund
Activism, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1085, 1102 (2015) (noting ROA “has been signiﬁcantly used
by ﬁnancial economists as a metric for operating performance”); David F. Larcker et al.,
Boardroom Centrality and Firm Performance, 55 J. Acct. & Econ. 225, 227 (2013) (using
ROA to measure ﬁrm performance).
266. See supra Table 6.
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D. Market Reaction to COW Adoptions
Because the results discussed in the previous section are based on
summary observational data, they are ill suited to support causal
inferences about the welfare effects of COW adoption. Many alternative
stories could explain the same relationships. For example, it may simply
be easier for opportunistic managers to adopt COWs in healthy
companies because shareholders might scrutinize board action less. That
said, our study’s focus on publicly traded companies permits us to use
alternative approaches to develop some insight into causal relationships.
One such approach is to examine the extent to which COWs contribute
to (or detract from) ﬁrm value by measuring the reaction of the capital
markets. To the extent that stock prices of public companies tend, on
average, to reﬂect publicly available information,267 one instructive
means for assessing COWs is to consider how market prices react to the
ﬁrst public disclosure an issuer makes about the existence of (or plans
for) a waiver. Our data set is amenable to such an inquiry: Indeed, we are
able to identify the ﬁrst disclosure date with all of Compustat-matched
ﬁrms reported in the previous subsection, which in turn allows us to
match these ﬁrms to their securities market prices as reported in the
CRSP database. We measure market reaction to the disclosure of news
using the familiar event-study approach.268
In order to implement an event-study analysis with sample data, we
matched the ﬁrst available disclosure date for each unique COW with
securities-market pricing data for each disclosing issuer. This matching
process led to the loss of approximately 100 observations from the 377
Compustat-matched ﬁrms.269 To estimate reliably the parameters (αi and
267. This is the most popular articulation of the phenomenon sometimes referred to
as the semi-strong form of the efficient capital market hypothesis (ECMH). Although the
ECMH has drawn some critics over the years, most economists tend to continue to
subscribe to its general precepts. See Steven L. Jones & Jeffry M. Netter, Efficient Capital
Markets, in Concise Encyclopedia of Economics 138, 139–41 (David R. Henderson ed., 2d
ed. 2008) (outlining the debate over the ECMH and ultimately concluding the ECMH is
“still useful” partially because “the response of stock prices to new information reasonably
approximates the change in the intrinsic value of equity”). The U.S. Supreme Court has
recently reaffirmed its own general acceptance of the ECMH in the context of securities
market litigation. See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2410
(2014).
268. For an overview of event-study methodology, see generally Charles J. Corrado,
Event Studies: A Methodology Review, 51 Acct. & Fin. 207 (2011). An important feature of
a securities-market event study is a designated methodology for predicting the “expected
return” of the stock. See id. at 209–10. This step is conventionally accomplished by
adverting to an asset-pricing model in ﬁnance—which predicts a stock’s return as a
function of overall market conditions. See id. Many alternative asset-pricing model
variations exist within the literature, but perhaps the most prominent of them is the
capital asset pricing model (CAPM). See Ivo Welch, Corporate Finance 242 (3d ed. 2014)
(noting the CAPM is “dominant”). In what follows, we deploy the CAPM as a baseline, but
we check the robustness of our results against a variety of alternative pricing models.
269. Data Set, supra note 219.
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βi) for each of the remaining stocks using the underlying asset-pricing
model, we additionally required each matched issuer to have sufficient
predisclosure days of trading (in this case thirty-ﬁve days) at least one
month prior to the disclosed COW. This criterion—while consistent with
standard practices for avoiding speciﬁcation error270—imposed a
signiﬁcant data limitation: Because many COWs are disclosed as part of
either new or newly spun-off companies, many of our COW-disclosing
issuers had insufficient trading days preceding the disclosure. In the end,
we were able to identify just over eighty distinct issuers that had sufficient
predisclosure pricing information to perform an event study.271
We considered three different event windows, each beginning one
day prior to the recorded date of the COW disclosure (to allow for some
predisclosure leaks) and ending either one, two, or three days postdisclosure. Figure 5 graphs the mean cumulative abnormal returns (CARs)
of the disclosing issuers (pictured with the solid line) and the 95%
conﬁdence interval around that mean (pictured with the two dotted lines
above and below). We estimate expected returns using the capital asset
pricing model (CAPM).
FIGURE 5: MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN OF COW DISCLOSERS272

Figure 5 suggests a statistically imprecise—but economically
signiﬁcant—positive market reception to the disclosure of a COW. For all
event windows chosen, COW disclosures predict a positive market
reaction, with CARs hovering between 0.5% and 1.3%.273 The noise
associated with these estimates is nontrivial, but for the four- and ﬁve-day
270. See Eugene F. Fama et al., The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information,
10 Int’l Econ. Rev. 1, 4–5 (1969) (describing the exclusions necessary to avoid speciﬁcation error).
271. Data Set, supra note 219.
272. The solid line represents CARs, and the dashed line represents 95% confidence
intervals.
273. Supra Figure 5.
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event windows, the effect is borderline statistically signiﬁcant at the
standard 95% conﬁdence level (two-tailed test).274
We interrogated the robustness of these results in two ways. First,
we varied the nature of the underlying asset-pricing model, introducing (1) a simpler market-adjusted abnormal return measure (the
equivalent of setting βi = 1 for all ﬁrms); (2) the Fama–French threefactor model, which combines the equity risk premium from CAPM
with premia on a large versus small portfolio and a high book-tomarket versus low book-to-market portfolio;275 and (3) the Carhart
four-factor model, which extends the three-factor model by adding a
momentum factor.276 Table 7 reproduces the results.277
TABLE 7: CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS ON FIRST COW DISCLOSURE278
Asset Pricing
Model

Event Window
(−1, +1)

(−1, +2)

(−1, +3)

0.63%
(1.789**)
0.51%
(1.127)

1.75%
(2.011**)
1.55%
(2.463***)

1.22%
(1.566*)
0.97%
(1.349*)

Fama–French
Three-Factor
Model

0.59%
(0.568)

1.49%
(2.126**)

0.91%
(1.236)

Fama–French–
Carhart FourFactor Model

0.73%
(1.004)

1.70%
(2.339***)

1.18%
(1.227)

Observations

81

81

81

Market-Adjusted
Returns
CAPM

274. Supra Figure 5.
275. See Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Common Risk Factors in the Returns
on Stocks and Bonds, 33 J. Fin. Econ. 3, 7–10 (1993).
276. See Mark M. Carhart, On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, 52 J. Fin. 57,
61–62 (1997).
277. The event studies here on COW disclosures are based on entities that ﬁled the
disclosing document. However, entities other than the issuer adopting a COW may ﬁle or
join the ﬁling of that disclosure. As a result, we cannot guarantee that the corporation
bound by a COW is the relevant ﬁler in each instance (although they will almost always be
a party affected by the COW). In future work, we intend to address this limitation. For now,
this limitation could introduce attenuation bias reducing the statistical and economic
magnitudes of our results. As a result, our event study may be a lower bound for a result
based exclusively on COW-adopting entities.
278. Figures without parentheses are cumulative abnormal returns; ﬁgures in
parentheses are nonparametric generalized Z-statistics for the sign of CAR (up–down). ***
denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the p < 0.01 level; ** denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the
p < 0.05 level; * denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the p < 0.10 level (one-tailed test).
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As with Figure 5, abnormal returns continue to be estimated with
appreciable noise, and many of the estimated effects are statistically
insigniﬁcant at conventional thresholds.279 Nevertheless, none of the
estimation approaches yields negative abnormal returns for the
announcement of a waiver, and for many speciﬁcations, the average CAR
was economically signiﬁcant—hovering around 1%.280 Note further that
the four-day event window spanning days (−1, +2) persistently yields the
CAR estimates with the largest magnitudes, and it is statistically
signiﬁcant in all cases.281 This is consistent with the news of a COW
disclosure taking some time to penetrate the market. However, the
weakening of this effect in the (−1, +3) window—an attenuation that
largely ﬂattens out for longer event windows—suggests that some of the
initial average response dampens.282 We view these results as evidence that the
adoption of a COW does not appear to predict loss of market value: If anything,
the opposite is true.
Even if a COW disclosure predicts a mildly positive market response,
however, it does not follow that this response is visited evenly on all types
of ﬁrms. As noted in the previous section, issuers within our sample differ
along a variety of dimensions, including incorporation jurisdiction, size,
and the type and nature of the waiver at issue.283 For some types of ﬁrms
(or some types of waivers), the market response is bound to be negative.
Although our event study sample is limited in size, it allows us to push on
some of these issues further. We therefore broke down our event study
along a variety of groupings of the data: Delaware versus non-Delaware
incorporation, location of the waiver, who is covered by the waiver,
breadth of the waiver, and size of the issuer (as measured by assets).
Along each of these dimensions, we measured the CARs associated with a
CAPM model and an event window of (−1, +2). Table 8 reports these
results.

279. See supra Table 7.
280. Supra Table 7.
281. See supra Table 7.
282. See supra Table 7.
283. See supra section III.C.
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TABLE 8: CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS BY GROUP284
Category

In-Group CAR
Delaware

In-Group CAR
Not Delaware

Issuer’s State of
Incorporation

1.67%
(2.318**)

0.97%
(0.854)

N = 67
Charter

N = 14
Not Charter

1.28%
(1.675**)

3.35%
(2.415***)

N = 51
Officers Covered

N = 24
Officers Not Covered

1.68%
(1.809**)

1.70%
(1.679**)

N = 35
Shareholders
Covered

N = 44
Shareholders Not
Covered

1.53%
(−0.457)

1.56%
(3.006***)

N = 17
Broad

N = 64
Narrow

1.66%
(1.800**)

1.32%
(1.729**)

N = 55
Large

N = 26
Small

0.66%
(1.422*)

2.30%
(2.038**)

N = 37

N = 44

Location of COW

Coverage of Provision

Breadth of Provision

Size of Issuer

284. In each case, we calculate mean CAR using the CAPM and a (−1, +2) event
window around the first COW disclosure. Figures without parentheses are mean
cumulative abnormal returns; ﬁgures in parentheses are nonparametric generalized Zstatistics for the sign of CAR (up–down). *** denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the p < 0.01
level; ** denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the p < 0.05 level; * denotes statistical
signiﬁcance at the p < 0.10 level (one-tailed test). For the table, the CAPM is used as the
baseline asset-pricing model with the event window of (−1, +2) around ﬁrst COW
disclosure. A “broad” provision speciﬁes either “all” corporate opportunities are waived or
corporate opportunities are waived “to the fullest extent allowed” by law. Issuers are
considered “large” if they have total assets in excess of $1 billion; otherwise, they are
“small.”
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Table 8 provides several interesting insights. Note that the Delawareincorporated ﬁrms’ COWs appear to enjoy a uniquely positive market
reception, with a mean CAR of 1.67% that is strongly signiﬁcant.285 NonDelaware issuers, in contrast, experience a milder (and statistically
insigniﬁcant) upward abnormal return of approximately thirty basis
points.286 Somewhat surprisingly, locating a waiver in a charter
amendment provision (meaning it would be voted on and potentially
priced by shareholders287) does not seem to improve market reception.
To the contrary, COWs executed outside of the charter seem to be met
with an especially positive mean abnormal return.288 A particularly
interesting aspect of Table 8 concerns how and whether coverage of a
corporate officer or dominant shareholder interacts with market
reception. One might—on ﬁrst principles—be especially skeptical about
waivers that protect officers and corporate shareholders on the theory
that those are the constituencies most susceptible to problematic
conﬂicts of interest. Table 8, however, suggests that COWs covering
officers or shareholders do not trigger negative reactions in the capital
markets.
Additionally, note that the breadth of the provision does not appear
to explain much in predicting market response.289 However, ﬁrm size
does: Smaller ﬁrms (those with under $1 billion in assets) tend to beneﬁt
the most from COWs.290 Indeed, they beneﬁt to a signiﬁcant degree—
with a four-day CAR of nearly 2.3%.291 This makes sense in light of
theoretical justiﬁcations for allowing COWs. Small ﬁrms seem more likely
to exist in streamlined entrepreneurial environments, drawing on the
expertise of many corporate ﬁduciaries who have many prospective
conﬂicts as the ﬁrm grows. Large established ﬁrms, in contrast, seem
more likely to have signiﬁcant scope of operations, with greater resources
available to attract managerial talent.
A signiﬁcant concern in analyzing the ﬁrst disclosure of a COW is
the “bundled” nature of most disclosures. As detailed earlier, the vast
majority of waiver disclosures are made alongside many other disclosures
(such as in a 10-K, a 10-Q, or a public-offering-related ﬁling).292 And even
when the COW disclosure is made in a more sui generis ﬁling (such as an
8-K), the disclosure tends to accompany other news (such as an
announced restructuring, signiﬁcant investor, or equity carve out).293
285. Supra Table 8.
286. Supra Table 8.
287. State law generally requires a shareholder vote as a precondition to a charter
amendment. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 242(b)(2017).
288. See supra Table 8.
289. See supra Table 8.
290. See supra Table 8.
291. Supra Table 8.
292. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
293. Data Set, supra note 219.
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One could argue that such information bundling represents a
prohibitive statistical confound, which could easily lead to a spurious
misattribution of any observed abnormal returns.
While this critique raises legitimate concerns, it is not entirely clear
what the appropriate response should be in the speciﬁc context of
COWs. As detailed in Part I, the principal impetus behind the reform
movement led by Delaware was the argument that COWs are a critical
ingredient of value-enhancing corporate structures and transactions—the same
ones to which COWs are now routinely attached.294 In other words, advocates
of the reform made a strong (and to Delaware, ultimately convincing)
argument that many types of innovative investment and ﬁnancing
structures would not be possible without the availability of a waiver. To
the extent this account is plausible, a COW constitutes a “but-for” cause
of the transaction accompanying it. The bundled nature of waiver
disclosures, then, may be less of a bug than a feature—a manifestation of
the very economic beneﬁts COWs were designed to unleash.
That said, one alternative lens through which to analyze the extent
to which COWs contribute to shareholder value is by exploiting the fact
that since Delaware’s reform in 2000, eight additional states have
adopted statutes permitting COWs.295 From any given incorporated
company’s perspective, the timing of such reforms is plausibly exogenous. As a robustness check, then, we investigated the market response to
the passage of COW-enabling statutes across each of the nine states
detailed in Table 1. To mark the relevant “event date” in each state, we
concentrated not on the statute’s effective date (as detailed in Table 1)
but rather on the date on which any remaining uncertainty about
enactment’s inevitability was resolved: the date the state’s governor
signed the legislative bill. The signing date is also frequently a
newsworthy event (and is typically accompanied by contemporaneous
signing statements, legislative synopses, or press releases),296 helping
ensure that it was generally known among the relevant investor
communities. Around this event date, we made a similar inquiry to those
made in the COW-disclosure event studies, pertaining to whether there
was a measurable abnormal return in and around the signing date

294. See supra section I.B.2 (describing the factors leading to the 2000 amendments);
infra note 327 and accompanying text (noting COW adoptions by ﬁrms with private-equity
ownership).
295. See supra section I.B.4.
296. See, e.g., Permitting Advance Action Regarding Business Opportunities Under
the Business Corporation Act, S. 5031, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2015); Stephan H.
Coonrod & Annamarie C. Larson, Washington’s New Provisions on Advance Waivers of
Corporate Opportunities: Opening the Road for Investors, K&L Gates (Apr. 28, 2015),
http://www.klgates.com/washingtons-new-provisions-on-advance-waivers-of-corporateopportunities-opening-the-road-for-investors-04-28-2015 [http://perma.cc/BKZ2-LUEB].
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among issuers incorporated in the reforming state.297 A graphical
representation of the results appears in Figure 6.
FIGURE 6: MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN AROUND BILL
SIGNING DATE FOR FIRMS INCORPORATED IN STATE298

Figure 6 shows that market responses in the days immediately
surrounding the various signing dates appear once again to be positive,
hovering somewhere in the 0.4% to 0.8% range up to a week out. Not
surprisingly, the economic magnitude of the detected effect is more
modest than in the case of COW disclosures,299 since the enabling bill’s
enactment merely gives issuers the real option of adopting a waiver at a
later date (presumably as part of a larger ﬁnancial transaction or
restructuring). It is also worth noting that the positive CARs observed in
the ﬁrst week following signing dissipate (and effectively disappear) for
longer periods.300 Nevertheless, it is still a fair conclusion from this
preliminary assessment that if anything, securities markets reacted mildly
favorably to the enabling act’s execution in those states embracing
reform.301
297. Speciﬁcally, we measured mean CAR starting two days before the event date and
up through ten days after the event date.
298. The solid line represents mean cumulative abnormal returns, and the dashed
line represents 95% confidence intervals.
299. Compare supra Figure 5 (showing mean CAR hovering between 0.5% and 1.3%),
with supra Figure 6 (reporting mean CAR between 0.4% and 0.8%).
300. See supra Figure 6.
301. In the interests of full disclosure, we considered two alternative focal events: the
introduction of the enabling bill and the date of its passage in the last legislative house
before gubernatorial execution. In both cases, cumulative abnormal returns tended to
ﬂuctuate around zero and were statistically insigniﬁcant. It is also worth noting that this
event study is at best merely suggestive. Corporate law reforms, somewhat analogous to
corporations’ disclosures, typically bundle together multiple legislative enactments, such
that we cannot disaggregate the markets’ response to the COW enactment speciﬁcally. We
do not attempt to resolve that limitation here, but leave it to further research.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS
The foregoing analysis is no doubt just the tip of the iceberg when it
comes to understanding the incidence, drivers, and effects of COWs.
Indeed, a key impetus behind this project was a desire to understand
more about the results of the statutory experiment started over a decade
and a half ago in the Delaware State Legislature. The data set we have
developed here will not only inform future academics and researchers,
but it also may provide helpful feedback to those interested in shaping
and ﬁne-tuning the substance of ﬁduciary law in the future. That said,
our analysis of COWs within public companies affords us a few potential
policy insights. This Part explores four potential implications. Section
IV.A discusses the relevance of this Article’s ﬁndings for evaluating the
success of COWs, while section IV.B considers whether it is appropriate to
generalize these ﬁndings to the duty of loyalty more generally. Next,
section IV.C turns to the question of who should design corporate
governance arrangements, and section IV.D examines the potential
effects of COWs on social welfare, focusing on the possibility of anticompetitive effects.
A.

Evaluating COWs

Many outside observers and investors would plausibly react with
alarm when reading a broadly worded COW such as the following: “BE
IT RESOLVED: That the Company waives Mr. Ellison’s obligation . . . to
present Corporate Opportunities to the Company.”302 The breadth of
such a provision immediately conjures up images of a thicket of
dysfunctional agency costs traditionally believed to plague the diffuse
ownership structures of public corporations. Indeed, we initially shared
this same instinct. However, this Article’s empirical and conceptual
analysis suggests that such fears may actually be mistaken—or at least
overblown.
From a purely descriptive perspective, based on the evidence
analyzed in section III.C, it appears that COW adoptions tend not to
reﬂect an opportunistic free-for-all among corporate ﬁduciaries. We ﬁnd
little evidence, for example, that COWs are typically embraced by
underperforming ﬁrms at which opportunism and agency costs are
rife.303 Adopting ﬁrms appear instead to be moderate in size, with
appreciable growth potential, robust revenue patterns, and relatively
strong market returns.304

302. NetSuite Inc., Board Resolutions Approving Corporate Opportunity Waiver
(Form S-1/A, exh. 4.5) (Dec. 17, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
1117106/000119312507266011/dex45.htm [http://perma.cc/T25A-U4AE].
303. See supra notes 264–266 and accompanying text.
304. See supra Table 6.
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Section III.D’s event-study analysis, which is better situated to
account for causal inference, suggests a similar conclusion: If anything,
securities markets generally appear to welcome the disclosure of COWs,
generating weak positive abnormal returns on announcement, although
these effects are often not statistically signiﬁcant.305 This positive
response appears concentrated in moderately sized ﬁrms and in
Delaware corporations.306 The underlying scope, breadth, and location of
a COW may well matter, but it does not appear to be as critical a
statistical factor as some might have thought.307 Indeed, if anything, the
results tend to cut against plausible concerns about speciﬁc types of
waivers. For instance, one might reasonably expect waivers covering
officers or dominant shareholders—or those that are conspicuously
broad (such as Mr. Ellison’s)—to be the most value destroying. The
market reaction, however, suggests that investors do not recoil at such
disclosures.308
B.

Contractualizing the Duty of Loyalty?

One obvious question raised by Delaware’s statutory experiment is
whether it has any implications for debates about contractualizing the
duty of loyalty in general and turning corporate law’s few mandatory
rules into defaults. Even if the normative picture is muddy, for instance, a
reader might be tempted to infer based on our ﬁndings that
corporations would have a similar appetite for contractual tailoring in
other duty of loyalty contexts as they have shown with respect to the
COD.
There are two reasons for caution here, however. First, the legal
terrain of the duty of loyalty is varied, and its dimensions differ in
important ways.309 For instance, the COD may simply be much more
complex, indeterminate, and prone to litigation than other forms of
conduct proscribed by the duty of loyalty, such as self-interested transactions between ﬁduciaries and the corporation. If this is the case, then
opting out of the COD might have proved popular, but the same ﬁrms
might induce dissimilar reactions in waiving other aspects of loyalty.
Second, and relatedly, if one of the principal reasons ﬁrms contract
out of the COD is due to the litigation risks the doctrine generates,310
then an alternative explanation for the prevalence of COWs would be
their function in reducing the likelihood of litigation, rather than the
potential corporate governance beneﬁts discussed above. Both of these
caveats provide interesting avenues for future research that this Article
305. See supra section III.D; supra Table 7.
306. See supra section III.D; supra Table 8.
307. See supra section III.D; supra Table 8.
308. See supra section III.D; supra Table 8.
309. See supra section I.A.
310. See supra notes 196–198 and accompanying text.
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leaves for another day. Until they are answered, caution must be
exercised in generalizing from section 122(17) to other areas of the duty
of loyalty.
C.

Who Should Design Corporate Law and Governance?

If the master problem of corporate law is designing optimal
governance arrangements to resolve the principal–agent problem, then
one of the great “meta” questions in the background is precisely who
should determine those arrangements and when. A number of positive
and normative issues are implicated here, including the quality of the
governance structures offered by law and regulation; whether, when
those structures are defaults, corporations tailor their governance
around them and whether that governance is superior; and as a result,
whom the law should empower to have the last word on crucial
governance issues, such as the very loyalty of senior management.
These questions are too fundamental to be answered by any single
study or legal issue. Nonetheless, the corporate response to statutory
enactments liberalizing COWs—and the securities-market response to
that corporate response—have fascinating implications for these debates.
At least as regards this part of the duty of loyalty, one descriptive fact
seems unassailable: When freed to do so, a wide range of corporations
eagerly embrace the power to contract out of aspects of the duty of
loyalty.311 Further, such actions tend to meet with a generally positive
market response (or at least do not incur a market penalty).312
More broadly, our study may hold relevance for other domains of
the duty of loyalty in which some commentators have long advocated for
greater contractual freedom. For example, several law and economics
scholars have questioned whether certain insider trading prohibitions
should become more “default-like” in nature, with issuers possessing the
right to allocate insider trading rights as a form of incentive compensation to managers, employees, and other corporate ﬁduciaries.313 While
certain regulatory carve-outs already permit informed insiders to buy and
sell securities (such as the safe harbor for executives trading in an

311. See supra section III.B.
312. See supra section III.D.
313. See e.g., Ian Ayres & Joe Bankman, Substitutes for Insider Trading, 54 Stan. L.
Rev. 235, 267–75 (2001) (proposing “a default prohibition against insider trading by the
ﬁrm (or its non-managerial delegate)” with the possibility of opting out through a ﬁrm’s
articles of incorporation); David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A Coasian Model of
Insider Trading, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1449, 1458–64 (1987); Henry G. Manne, Insider
Trading and Property Rights in New Information, 4 Cato J. 933, 938 (1985). For a
fascinating picture of corporate policies restricting insiders’ trading beyond what is
required by law, see Laura Nyantung Beny & Anita Anand, Private Regulation of Insider
Trading in the Shadow of Lax Public Enforcement: Evidence from Canadian Firms, 3
Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 215 (2013).
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automatic 10b5-1 plan314), such provisions are far narrower, more formulaic, and arguably more hazardous315 than a broader grant of authority
to entities to allocate their insider trading rights, just as corporations now
do with corporate opportunities. In fact, the availability of COWs may
already enable contractualizing insider trading rights in part: Courts once
held the opportunity to make strategic stock transactions in other
companies’ stock to be a plausible corporate opportunity.316 A sufficiently
generous waiver could permit a ﬁduciary to enter such transactions (even
using conﬁdential corporate information) without abrogating her
ﬁduciary duties, the breach of which is a predicate element for Rule 10b5 liability under the “misappropriation” theory of insider trading.317 That
said, COWs generally do not (and cannot) insulate corporate insiders
from liability under the “traditional” insider-trading theory when they
purchase or sell their own company’s stock on the basis of material
nonpublic information.318
It is important to acknowledge that the availability of potential gains
from making loyalty more contractible need not imply that it is socially
optimal to give ﬁduciaries unimpeded power to do so. Indeed, as noted
in section I.B.2, the statutory reforms enabling COWs made nowhere
near such sweeping pronouncements. Rather, they allow expanded
contractual freedom to enter a waiver only under a speciﬁc condition:
that the process by which the waiver is promulgated must itself be free
from the taint of conﬂicts of interest.319 Like any other transaction,320 the
action of the board (or controlling shareholders) receives protection
under the business judgment rule only to the extent that it is
independent and free of inﬂuence from materially conﬂicted parties.
This caveat suggests that even the COW reforms did not completely
dispatch loyalty’s mandatory character from the COD. A more abstract
notion of immutable loyalty may still play a contributing role, albeit now
from a substantially greater distance.
D. Shareholder Versus Social Welfare
Even to the extent COWs enhance shareholder value, there is no
guarantee that they similarly serve broader social welfare goals. While
healthy marketplace competition may generally promote both the
welfare of shareholders and society, the two can diverge under a variety
314. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2017).
315. See, e.g., Alan D. Jagolinzer, SEC Rule 10b5-1 and Insiders’ Strategic Trade, 55
Mgmt. Sci. 224, 228–35 (2009) (documenting the gaming of the administrative rules
governing 10b5-1 plans by insiders).
316. See, e.g., In re eBay, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. C.A. 19988-NC, 2004 WL 253521,
at *4–5 (Del. Ch. Feb. 11, 2004).
317. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652–53 (1997).
318. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 (1983).
319. See supra notes 134–135 and accompanying text.
320. See supra section I.A.1.
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of familiar circumstances. One such circumstance is underscored by a
newly resurgent literature examining the potentially anticompetitive
effects of common ownership of natural competitors within the same
industry. A series of recent papers document the dramatic rise in large
ownership stakes by a small series of major institutional investors, such as
BlackRock, Fidelity, State Street, and Vanguard, which commentators
have widely assumed to be passive investors that exercise no inﬂuence
over the ﬁrms in which they invest.321 For instance, BlackRock is now one
of the ten largest shareholders of 70% of the 2,000 largest U.S. public
ﬁrms, with Vanguard approaching a similar scale of widespread and
signiﬁcant shareholding.322 As a result, a small number of institutional
investors commonly have the largest ownership stakes in multiple (if not
all) of the largest ﬁrms competing within a single industry.
Recent papers by José Azar, Isabel Tecu, and Professors Sahil Rina
and Martin Schmalz examine the potential anticompetitive effects of
shared ownership among competitors on those ﬁrms’ performance.
Their ﬁndings are striking: Common ownership correlates with higher
ticket prices in the airline industry,323 higher prices for services in
banking,324 and pay for executives that is based less on a ﬁrm’s own
performance and more on its rivals’ performance across a wide sample of
U.S. publicly traded ﬁrms.325 A limited set of exogenous events affecting
common ownership enables the authors to suggest a causal interpretation of these relationships.326 The bottom line of this and other recent
research is suggestive and worrying: Two fundamental desiderata of
modern ﬁnance—diversiﬁed shareholding and effective corporate
governance—may be deeply in tension with the maximization of social
welfare.
This line of research may also bear ominously on how one interprets
the positive reaction to COWs documented above. Shareholders may be
embracing COWs but at society’s expense, precisely because such
321. Miguel Anton et al., Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management
Incentives (Ross Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 1328, 2016), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2802332 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (studying the relationship
between common ownership and compensation arrangements for top management); Azar
et al., Anti-Competitive Effects, supra note 39 (outlining the theoretical case for the
anticompetitive effects of common ownership and developing an empirical study of those
effects in the airline industry); José Azar et al., Ultimate Ownership and Bank Competition
(July 23, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/-abstract=2710252 (on ﬁle
with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Azar et al., Bank Competition] (studying
common ownership’s anticompetitive effects in banking); see also Elhauge, supra note 39,
at 1301–16 (developing a legal framework for pursuing some forms of diversiﬁed common
shareholding as antitrust violations).
322. Anton et al., supra note 321, at 23.
323. Azar et al., Anti-Competitive Effects, supra note 39, at 17–31.
324. Azar et al., Bank Competition, supra note 321, at 17–31.
325. Anton et al., supra note 321, at 26–37.
326. See, e.g., Azar et al., Anti-Competitive Effects, supra note 39, at 21–26.
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provisions facilitate anticompetitive coordination among commonly
owned, same-industry ﬁrms. Indeed, anecdotally, we can observe that
many of the subjects of COWs in our sample are large private equity and
venture capital ﬁrms likely to have ownership stakes in competitors
within the same or related industries.327 While these ﬁrms are quite
different from passive, highly diversiﬁed institutional investors, their
horizontal ownership claims may plausibly be related to anticompetitive
effects as well. Indeed, many possible channels exist for COWs to serve as
effective mechanisms for dampening competition. Adopting a COW
could act as an informational device by which competing ﬁrms signal to
one another how they will carve up geographical areas or restrict
quantities to reduce competition. Alternatively, COWs could simply occur
among ﬁrms with overlapping directorates or dominant shareholders to
directly reduce the extent to which ﬁduciaries are obliged to present new
business prospects to ﬁrms to compete over. In either circumstance, the
normative complexion of COWs could look quite different.
Future research could adapt the approach undertaken here to study
whether COWs play a supporting role in suppressing competition. One
plausible avenue for this inquiry would be to examine whether common
ownership at either the ﬁrm or industry level predicts (or is predicted
by) increased incidence of waiver adoption.328 Additional event studies,
too, could interact market concentration measures with stock price
reactions to COW adoption, including whether an adopting ﬁrm’s
principal competitors experience positive abnormal returns around the
date of adoption. Locating an appropriate exogenous event that
increased common ownership could assist in pursuing causal identiﬁcation. This Article leaves such endeavors to pursue another day.

327. See, e.g., GoDaddy Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 35 (Nov. 25,
2015), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1609711/000160971115000032/gddy20151112xs1registrati.htm [http://perma.cc/RP3P-QHVL] (promulgating a waiver as to
private equity giants KKR and Silver Lake); HCA, Inc., Prospectus Supplement (Form
424B3), at 7, S-97 (Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/841985/
000119312514079396/d678917d424b3.htm [http://perma.cc/TMT8-EKL3] (promulgating
a waiver as to KKR and Bain Capital).
328. Pre-existing work in antitrust scholarship constructed a modiﬁcation of the
Herﬁndahl–Hirschman index (HHI)—the HHI is frequently used by regulators to
determine market concentration—called the MHHI, which includes measures of common
ownership across competitors within the same industry. See Timothy F. Bresnahan &
Steven C. Salop, Quantifying the Competitive Effects of Production Joint Ventures, 4 Int’l
J. Indus. Org. 155, 158–61 (1986); Daniel P. O’Brien & Steven C. Salop, Competitive
Effects of Partial Ownership: Financial Interest and Corporate Control, 67 Antitrust L.J.
559, 594–98 (2000); see also Anton et al., supra note 321 (adopting and deploying MHHI
in a study of the effects of common ownership on executive compensation structures).
The MHHIΔ (MHHI–HHI) captures the contribution of common ownership in particular
as separated from market concentration.
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CONCLUSION
At the turn of this century, Delaware ignited an unprecedented,
multistate experiment in empowering corporations to waive the COD—
an integral part of the ﬁduciary duty of loyalty. Some sixteen years later,
this Article has presented what we believe is the ﬁrst systematic analysis of
how corporations responded to this wave of statutory reforms, as well as
related market reactions. Our empirical analysis suggests that public
companies have shown a signiﬁcant appetite for enacting waivers and
that their newfound contractual freedom has not been received
negatively among investors. This inquiry is interesting in its own right,
but it also shares a nexus with some of corporate law’s most important
and vexing questions. Descriptively, do corporations actively opt out of
corporate law’s default rules when freed to do so? And when they do
displace default rules, do such efforts add value or act as a new conduit
for managerial opportunism and agency costs? Only when we have a
good sense of the answers to both of these questions can we make
progress on a third, which is among corporate law’s most indispensable:
Are market forces sufficient to ensure optimal corporate governance for
corporations? This Article suggests that there may be substantial scope
for loosening at least some of the ossiﬁed strictures of the duty of loyalty,
permitting corporations greater freedom to tailor their governance
arrangements so as to best suit their needs and capabilities.
More generally, this Article also reveals an important lesson for the
complementary roles that theory, practice, and empiricism can play in
legal scholarship. Agency cost theories can provide helpful frames for
thinking about the normative stakes involved in analyzing ﬁduciary
waivers, but theory alone is often indeterminate. Practical experiences
can help generate insightful anecdotes and stories about purported “best
practices,” but they too can easily lead to errant conclusions. Lastly,
empirical investigation can provide precise evidence about observable
phenomena, but if such evidence is left untethered to underlying theory
and intuition, it remains unclear why such evidence is either relevant or
interesting. This Article has attempted to make contributions along all
three dimensions, gleaning in the process a rich collection of insights
that can usefully inform policy debates. Our analysis explored the course
that Delaware ﬁduciary law has begun to chart into the twenty-ﬁrst
century. It is a course in which stakes remain endemically high, and
foundational debates constantly recur. And perhaps consequently, it is a
site at which empirical inquiry seems long overdue.
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APPENDIX
TABLE A.1: STATE COW STATUTES
State

Citation to Statutory Provision

Delaware

Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 122(17) (2017)

Oklahoma

Okla. Stat. tit. 18, § 1016(17) (2001)

Missouri

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 351.385(16) (2016)

Kansas

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 17-6102(17) (2014)

Texas

Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code Ann. § 2.2101(21) (West 2012)

Nevada

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 78.070(8) (2007)

New Jersey

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:3-1(q) (West 2016)

Maryland

Md. Code Ann., Corps. & Ass’ns § 2-103(15) (LexisNexis
2014)

Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 23B.02.020(5)(k) (2016)
TABLE A.2: CODING RUBRIC

General

Variable

Description

Operative Provision
Waiving COs

Is this excerpt the actual legal
action by which the ﬁling entity
adopts a COW?

Discussion of Operative
Provision Waiving COs

Or does this excerpt discuss that
the ﬁling entity has adopted a
COW, but has done so
elsewhere?

Location Charter

Is the operative provision
adopting a COW in the charter?

Location Bylaw

Is the operative provision
adopting a COW in the bylaws?

Location Board
Resolution

Is the operative provision
adopting a COW in a board
resolution?

Location Other

Is the operative provision
adopting a COW located in
another type of document?

Location Notes (e.g.,
two waivers in one
excerpt) [text]

Notes
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Variable

Description

All Officers Covered

Does the COW apply to all
officers in the ﬁling entity?

Any Officer(s) Covered

Does the COW apply to at least
one officer of the ﬁling entity?

General Notes [text]

Notes

CEO Covered

Does the COW apply to the
CEO?

Enumerated Officer
Covered

Does the COW apply to a speciﬁc
class of officers?

Officer Covered Notes
[text]

Notes

Any Director(s) Covered

Does the COW apply to at least
one director of the ﬁling entity?

All Directors Covered

Does the COW apply to all
directors of the ﬁling entity?

Enumerated Director
Covered

Does the COW apply to a speciﬁc
class of directors?

Directors Covered Notes
[text]

Notes

Any SHs Covered

Does the COW apply to at least
one shareholder of the ﬁling
entity?

All SHs Covered

Does the COW apply to all
shareholders of the ﬁling entity?

Enumerated or Speciﬁc
SHs Covered

Does the COW apply to a speciﬁc
class of shareholders?

SHs Covered Notes
[text]

Notes
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Description

Any Reference

Does the COW refer to another
entity besides the ﬁling entity?

Affiliate of Filer
(Including Parent or
Sub)

If the COW refers to another
entity than the ﬁling entity, is
that other entity an affiliate of
the ﬁling entity?

Waiver as to
company

Other
Company

[Vol. 117:1075

Does the COW apply to the
other entity?

Other Company
Referenced Notes [text]

Notes

CEO Covered

Does the COW apply to the CEO
of the other entity?

Any Officer(s) Covered

Does the COW apply to at least
one officer of the ﬁling entity?

Enumerated Officer
Covered

Does the COW apply to a speciﬁc
class of officers in the other
entity?

Officer Covered
Notes [text]

Notes

All Directors Covered

Does the COW apply to all
directors of the other entity?

Any Director(s) Covered

Does the COW apply to at least
one director of the other entity?

Enumerated Director
Covered

Does the COW apply to a speciﬁc
class of directors in the other
entity?

Directors Covered Notes
[text]

Notes

Any SHs Covered

Does the COW apply to at least
one shareholder of the other
entity?

All SHs Covered

Does the COW apply to all
shareholders of the other entity?

Enumerated or Speciﬁc
SHs Covered

Does the COW apply to a speciﬁc
class of shareholders in the other
entity?

SHs Covered Notes
[text]

Notes

2017]

CORPORATE OPPORTUNITY WAIVERS
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Variable

Description

Fullest Extent of Law

Does the COW mention that the
waiver applies to the “fullest
extent of law” or materially
identical language?

“All” COs

Does the COW waive the ﬁling
company’s interest in all
corporate opportunities as to
those covered?

“All but . . .”
enumerated exceptions

Does the COW waive the ﬁling
company’s interest in all
corporate opportunities as to
those covered, except for a
speciﬁc class of opportunities
that are not waived?

Speciﬁed COs /
Categories Waived [text]

Notes

Scope of
Waiver

All variables are coded “1” for present, “0” for absent, and “-99” for
undecided, other than the ten “Notes” categories, which are demarcated
with “[text]” and are optional categories that coders can ﬁll in with detail
from the text of the excerpt. For excerpts that were “false positives” (that
is, irrelevant documents mistakenly included in our population by our
search algorithm), coders simply entered 0’s for each row.
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